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Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape:
The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue
and Its Implications for Expert
Psychological Testimony*
Toni M. Massaro**
INTRODUCTION
A twenty-one-year-old woman went alone one night to a
private club. Shortly after arriving, she was approached by a
man she did not know. He joined her at her booth; they talked
and had two drinks together. The man falsely claimed that he
had a Ph.D. and M.D. and was currently writing a book about
people, based on his interviews with them. She naively be-
lieved him and agreed to be interviewed for the book.'
After talking for over an hour and a half with the woman,
the man offered to arrange a trip to Nassau to repay her for as-
sisting with the book.2 She agreed to accompany him to the
house of one of his friends to make the arrangements. They
drove to what was actually the man's house, where he pre-
tended to make the travel reservations.3 Later, the man told
her that she looked nervous and gave her a small white pill
* © 1984 by Toni M. Massaro and @ 1985 by the MiNNEsOTA LAW
REVIEW FOUNDATION. All rights reserved.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of
Law (Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, 1984-1985). I
am indebted to Professors Charles Laughlin, Martha Morgan, Thomas Shaffer,
and Shaun Shaughnessy for thoughtful and valuable criticisms of earlier drafts
of this Article; to Dr. Ann Bristow for insight into the psychological effects of
rape; to my research assistant Sharon Brewer, Washington & Lee Law '85, for
many months of able work; to Michael Compagni, Washington & Lee Law '86,
for editorial assistance; and to the Frances Lewis Law Center at Washington &
Lee University for financial support of the research for this article.
1. State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 646, 647 P.2d 1292, 1294 (1982); cf People
v. Evans, 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (involving
facts distressingly similar to those of Marks). The format of this introduction
is suggested by Bristow's article on the Marks decision. Bristow, State v.
Marks. An Analysis of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 9 ViC-
TIMOLOGY 273, 273-74 (1984).
2. Marks, 231 Kan. at 646, 647 P.2d at 1294.
3. Id.
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that made her dizzy. He then virtually forced her to take an-
other pill, which made her dizziness worse.4
The man led the woman to the bedroom, where she lay
down on the bed. He drew a chair next to the bed and began to
quiz her about her sex life. When she refused to answer, he be-
came angry and started to remove her clothes. He choked her
and tried to smother her with a pillow; she tried to resist but
was too dizzy to escape. The man then told her that if she
would not stop fighting he would kill her.5 After a long strug-
gle, he forced her into sexual intercourse and oral sodomy. Af-
terwards, he gave the woman a shower and massage and drove
her to her car. The woman drove home and told her roommate
what had happened; the roommate telephoned the police.6 The
woman alleged that she had been raped;7 the man admitted
sexual intercourse but asserted that the woman had consented.8
At the trial, the prosecution called Dr. Herbert Modlin, a
board-certified psychiatrist and neurologist who practices psy-
chiatry and teaches at the Menninger Foundation.9 Dr. Modlin
described for the jury a type of posttraumatic stress disorder la-
beled "rape trauma syndrome" (RTS) that results from a sex-
ual assault.10 The symptoms of RTS, according to Dr. Modlin,
include "fear of offender retaliation, fear of being raped again,
fear of being home alone, fear of men in general, fear of being
out alone, sleep disturbance, change in eating habits and sense
of shame.""
Dr. Modlin had examined the victim two weeks after the
incident. Based on this examination, he concluded that the wo-
man was the victim of a "frightening assault, an attack"12 and
that she was suffering from RTS symptoms. This expert testi-
mony was admitted to prove that a forcible assault had
occurred.13
The jury convicted the man of rape and aggravated sod-
omy.14 On appeal, defense counsel argued that Dr. Modlin's
testimony on RTS had invaded the province of the jury and was
4. Id
5. Id.
6. Id at 646-47, 647 P.2d at 1294-95.
7. Id. at 647, 647 P.2d at 1295.
8. See id. at 651-52, 647 P.2d at 1298.
9. Id at 647, 647 P.2d at 1295.
10. Id. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 646, 647 P.2d at 1294.
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based solely on hearsay statements made by the victim during
the psychiatric evaluation.15 The Kansas Supreme Court held
that the expert's opinion did not invade the province of the
jury; it was in fact relevant and proper and was subject to at-
tack on cross-examination.16 The court found that although
rape trauma syndrome has only recently been identified, it is
generally accepted to be a common reaction to sexual assault.
Testimony regarding its presence in a victim is therefore prop-
erly admissible as evidence when offered by a qualified witness
who has had an adequate opportunity to evaluate the victim.17
The court further held that although the expert's conclusions
were based in part on hearsay, his testimony was admissible be-
cause the hearsay facts were introduced into evidence through
in-court testimony by the victim and her roommate.'8
The California,19 Minnesota,20 and Missouri2l Supreme
Courts disagree with the Kansas decision. In their view, identi-
fication of rape trauma syndrome is "not the type of scientific
test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape has
occurred."22 Because these courts view rape trauma syndrome
as a therapeutic tool rather than a fact-finding device, they
maintain that using it as evidence will unfairly prejudice the
jury.2 3 The jury must decide, say the courts, what actually hap-
pened and not how most people react to rape. These courts also
assert that an expert's testimony that the complainant was
raped or that the victim did not fantasize the rape is equally
unhelpful and usurps the jury's duty to find facts and evaluate
credibility.24 Moreover, to permit an expert to put his or her
imprimatur on the complainant's version of the incident could
overawe the jury by creating an aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness.25
15. Id. at 653-54, 647 P.2d at 1299-1300.
16. Id. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 655, 647 P.2d at 1300.
19. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1984).
20. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982) (en banc); State v. Mc-
Gee, 324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982) (en banc).
21. State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
22. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229; see also Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at _ 681 P.2d
at 300-01, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459-60 (to same effect).
23. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229-30; Taylor 663 S.W2.d at 238-42.
24. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231-32; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241.
25. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230; see also Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at _ 681 P.2d
at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 (quoting Saldana with approval); Taylor, 663
S.W.2d at 241 (quoting Saldana with approval).
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The sharp conflict between the Kansas court and the other
three courts raises troublesome and provocative issues. The ad-
missibility of RTS as evidence in rape trials in which the de-
fendant claims consent involves important policy questions
about rape, about expert psychological testimony, about jurors'
attitudes, and about the way judges deal with novel scientific
theories.
This Article first examines the mythology and the fears
that people have about rape and ways in which those views af-
fect jurors, judges, and victims, paying particular attention to
the problems of false accusation and of distinguishing seduction
from rape. The Article then discusses the evidentiary rules
that govern the admissibility of expert testimony and novel sci-
entific theories and describes the application of these rules to
expert testimony about RTS. Finally, the Article examines the
proper role of psychology in the courtroom and reviews the
various approved uses of expert psychological testimony. The
Article concludes that the California, Minnesota, and Missouri
courts' exclusion of expert testimony on RTS cannot be recon-
ciled with judicial acceptance of other forms of expert testi-
mony. It also demonstrates that RTS evidence can help the
fact finder resolve difficult issues of guilt or innocence and that
such evidence can educate jurors and judges, which may help
correct erroneous social attitudes about the crime of rape. The
Article underscores the need for reform of the process by
which judges determine the admissibility of expert psychologi-
cal testimony and concludes that psychologists have an appro-
priate, even necessary, role in the legal system.
I. RAPE: THE PERCEPTIONS AND THE REALITY
To understand the controversy surrounding the use of ex-
pert testimony about RTS to prove that intercourse was not
consensual, it is important to consider the ways in which rape
differs from other violent crimes, both in reality and in popular
conception. The word "rape" itself evokes a range of images,
emotions, and concepts. People disagree strongly about what
rape is, why rape occurs, and even what evidence should be ad-
mitted or required to prove that rape occurred.26 Furthermore,
26. See, e.g., Rudstein, Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems,
18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1976); Note, Evidence-Rape Trials-Victim's
Prior Sexual History, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 362 (1975); Note, Repeal of the Cor-
roboration Requirement: Will It Tip the Scales of Justice?, 24 DRAKE L. REV.
669 (1975); Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to
[Vol. 69:395
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most people are uncomfortable when rape is mentioned or dis-
cussed.27 That discomfort may emphasize the differences be-
tween rape and other violent crimes by preventing rational
discussion about rape and thus accentuating the disagreements
about rape. Despite the substantive disagreements about what
rape is, however, most people agree with Professor Vivian Ber-
ger that both people and the law treat rape as "something
the Prior Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible
Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial of Due Process9, 3 HoFsTRA L RIv. 403
(1975); see also infra text accompanying notes 241-46 (noting that courts in
many jurisdictions have inherent power to require psychiatric exam of a rape
complainant where charge is uncorroborated, despite argument that such ex-
ams invade victim's privacy and serve no useful purpose in determining com-
plainant's credibility).
27. As one author has observed, people have "trouble with rape" because:
[Tihe mention of rape makes us all uneasy-for different reasons de-
pending on who we are. It makes men uneasiest of all perhaps, and
usually brings forth an initial response of nervous laughter or guffaw-
evoking jokes. After all, as far as the normal, but uninformed, man
knows, rape is something he might suddenly do himself some night if
life becomes too dull. It isn't, of course, but he knows too little about
it to realize that.
On the other hand, the thoughtful normal man, after hearing the
details of a forcible rape, finds it difficult to believe.... He knows
that all thoughts of sex-which he equates with fun, romance, and
mutual admiration-would leave him if the woman were really strug-
gling to get free .... He does not realize that, to the rapist, the act
is not "love," not ardor, and usually not even passion; it is a way of
debasing and degrading a woman .... This gives rise to the com-
monly held view that: "There is no such thing as rape.".. . To most
women, [rape] is almost as unreal as it is to most men because they
themselves have not experienced it, and few people who have done so
are in the habit of talking about it....
At the same time, an occasional newspaper story about a particu-
larly brutal rape-murder makes all women shudder. They wonder if
it could possibly happen to them, and if it did, how would they re-
act ...
One way of coping.., is to imagine, and then believe, that wo-
men to whom rape happens are in some way vastly different from
oneself. Deciding that they must have been taller, shorter, fatter,
thinner, older, or younger will not work since rape victims come in all
variations of these attributes. It is far easier to settle on some impal-
pable quality which is not so easily measured with a ruler or scale.
This accounts for the overwhelming number of women who believe
that most claims of being raped are either outright lies, or that the
rapes were brought on by the victim herself ....
C. HuRscH, THE TROUBLE WrrH RAPE 5-7 (1977). This is, of course, but one
explanation for people's uneasiness about rape. Violent crime in general
makes people uneasy because it reminds them of their own vulnerability and
of the human capacity for destructiveness and evil. As argued below, however,
people's uneasiness about rape goes beyond, and differs from, their uneasiness
about violent crime in general. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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different."28
The crime of rape is unique because it involves an underly-
ing act that, in the absence of coercion or physical harm, is both
pleasurable and necessary to society.29 Only the intent and per-
ceptions of the participants, often ambiguous and conflicting,
determine whether the act has crossed the line between lawful,
consensual intercourse and unlawful, forcible rape. Further
blurring the line between consensual intercourse and rape is
our culture's linking of sex with violence3o and the often un-
clear or inadequate communication between men and women
about their sexual needs and desires.31 These factors may make
28. Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Court-
room, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); see also Ross, The Overlooked Expert in
Rape Prosecutions, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 707, 710-13 (1983). The treatment of
rape differs from the treatment of other violent crimes in that many jurisdic-
tions define it as sex-specific, but see infra note 36 (examples of gender-neu-
tral rape definitions), or require that a victim prove she resisted. Some
jurisdictions require corroboration or view the victim's chastity as a relevant,
even critical, factor. In most states a husband cannot rape his wife. Many ju-
risdictions impose harsh penalties on rapists and courts sometimes give the
jury a unique instruction that the charge of rape is easily made and difficult to
defend although the accused may be innocent. Berger, supra, at 7-10; see infra
notes 57 & 94-96 and accompanying text. Another legal anomaly in rape cases
is the "prompt complaint" doctrine, under which evidence that the victim
made a prompt report of the assault is admissible, even though the complaint
is hearsay and bolsters the victim's in-court testimony. The rationale courts
offer for the exception is that without evidence of a prompt complaint, the fact
finder could infer recent fabrication by the victim. The assumptions underly-
ing this inference are that victims of sexual abuse will tell someone about the
incident soon after it occurs; that without the testimony jurors will assume the
victim did not make a prompt complaint; and that this inference would ad-
versely affect the victim's credibility in the jurors' eyes. See Graham, The Cry
of Rape: The Prompt Complaint Doctrine and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
19 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 489, 492-94 (1983).
29. Some other crimes arguably share these characteristics. Consensual
touching is pleasurable and probably necessary to society; unwanted touching
is not pleasurable and can be unlawful as battery. Stealing property also in-
volves an underlying act-transfer of property-that, when voluntary, is nec-
essary and probably pleasurable. With both of these crimes, as with rape, the
closer the victim/offender relationship is, the harder it is to prove that the
touching/transfer of property was nonconsensual. In these other crimes, how-
ever, victim consent is not the key factor in deciding if the offense occurred,
nor is ambiguous victim conduct treated as precipitation of the offense as It is
in rape. See Schwartz, An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Re-
quirement from the Definition of Forcible Rape, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 567, 583-
88 (1983) (comparing robbery and rape).
30. Scherer, The Myth of Passion: Redefinition of Rape, in VICTIMIZATION
OF THE WEAK: CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL REACTIONS 156 (J. Scherer & G. Shep-
herd ed. 1982).
31. See Wiener, Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Con-
sent Standard in Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 145, 147-48 (1983).
[Vol. 69:395
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the crime of rape more difficult to identify than other crimes,
particularly in the "consent rape" cases,3 2 where intercourse is
admitted but the man claims consent while the woman claims
rape. This section will examine both the perceptions and reali-
ties of these factors that make rape unique.
A. WHAT IS RAPE?: THE LEGAL DEFINITION
Definitions of rape vary among time periods, disciplines,
ideological groups, and individuals.33 The common law defined
rape as unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman, forcibly and
against her will. 3 Today that definition is changings and some
state statutes have replaced the word rape with terms such as
sexual assault, sexual battery, or sexual abuse.36 This Article
uses the definition of rape as sexual intercourse without the
victim's consent3 7 and analyzes situations in which the only
contested issue is whether the intercourse was consensual or
forced.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 68-70.
33. See, eg., V. BILLINGS, THE WOMANSBOOK (1974) ("Rape is a culturally
fostered means of suppressing women. Legally we say we deplore it, but
mythically we romanticize and perpetuate it, and privately we excuse and
overlook it."); S. BROWNILER, AGAINST OUR WnLL MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
14 (1975) (Rape is "man's basic weapon of force against woman, the principal
agent of his will and her fear... the ultimate test of his superior strength,
the triumph of his manhood."); J. WLLIaMS & K. HOLmES, THE SECOND As-
SAULT. RAPE AND PUBLIc A2"rrruDEs 54 (1981) ("Rape is the ultimate proof of
male power over females, and it is the final breach of a social barrier erected
by society between the dominant group and some racial and/or ethnic minori-
ties."); Dworkin, For Men, Freedom of Speech; for Women, Silence Please in
TAKE BACK THE NIGHr. WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 256, 257 (L. Lederer ed.
1980) (rape silences women); Fattah, Becoming a Victim: The Victimization
Experience and Its Aftermath, 6 VIcTIcmIoIoGY 29, 40 (1981) (explaining that
the law makes women culturally legitimate victims; for example, forcible sex-
ual intercourse with one's wife is not rape, and other violence against female
spouses is ignored or protected).
34. See i PERKINs & IL BoYcE, CRIbINAL LAW 197-98 (3d ed. 1982).
35. See id. at 198-200; Bienen, Rape III-National Developments in Rape
Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 170, 172-76 (1980).
36. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1404 (Supp. 1983) (sexual abuse);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1976) (sexual battery); IOWA CODE § 709.1
(1981) (sexual abuse); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 750.520a-.520e (West. Supp.
1984) (criminal sexual conduct); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.342-.345 (Vest Supp.
1984) (criminal sexual conduct); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1982 & Supp.
1983) (sexual assault).
37. It does not exclude marital rape, nor is it gender-specific, though all of
the cases cited deal with rape of a female by a male, and the pronouns used
reflect that fact. Not addressed directly are statutory rape and attempted
rape, although parts of the discussion may be relevant to these crimes.
1985]
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B. THE MYTHOLOGY OF RAPE
The many myths about rape compound people's difficulty
in understanding the crime.38 The more common myths in-
clude: good women don't get raped; an unwilling woman can-
not be raped; all rape victims are attractive, young women; the
victim provokes the rape because she wants to be raped or be-
cause she puts herself in a dangerous situation; women's sexual
fantasies prove they enjoy rape; women often make false accu-
sations of rape because they are revengeful, feel guilty, or are
pregnant; rapists are strangers to the victim; rapists rape be-
cause they are overcome by sudden, uncontrollable sexual im-
pulses; rapes occur in dark alleys; rapes are interracial; rape
only counts if the victim was a virgin.
These myths, however, are overwhelmingly refuted by the
data. Good women do get raped, and, although some women
may fantasize about aggressive sex, even with strangers, they
do not dream of violence and threats of death or injury.39 The
claim that rape is impossible unless the woman wants it ignores
completely the violence, expressed or threatened, often associ-
ated with the act and the profound, even paralyzing fear felt by
the victim.40 Rape victims include not only young, attractive
women 41 but also children, young boys, aged female adults,
male adults, and the handicapped.42 Rapists often plan their
38. See, e.g., J. BARKAS, VICTIMS 104-07 (1978); C. DEAN & M. DEBRUYN-
KoPs, THE CRIME AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE 33-38 (1982); C. HuRSc1H,
supra note 27, at 74-78; Berger, supra note 28, at 25-26; Scherer, supra note 30,
at 158-63.
39. C. DEAN & M. DEBRUYN-KOPs, supra note 38, at 35; see also Berger,
supra note 28, at 27-28. Barkas states that the myth that only women who re-
ally want to be raped are raped "survives despite the fact that the Federal
Crime Commission has concluded that only 4 percent of all reported rapes oc-
cur because of any precipitative victim behavior." J. BARKAS, supra note 38, at
104.
40. Hursch cites the tactic employed by some defense lawyers of illustrat-
ing that an unwilling woman can't be raped by trying to insert a lead pencil
into the opening of a moving Coke bottle. She describes this as a "puerile il-
lustration" of what rape is not and suggests that a more telling illustration
would be for someone twice the lawyer's size to put a gun to his head or a
knife to his throat and then ask if he would dare disobey an order to drop his
pants. C. HURSCH, supra note 27, at 78-79; see also M. AMIR, PATTERNS IN FOR-
CIBLE RAPE 161-74 (1971) (analyzing victim behavior and stating that "when
confronted with a threat to her life or physical well-being, the victim was not
willing to resist or fight").
41. See, e.g., H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 47 (1980).
42. See, e.g., C. DEAN & M. DEBRUYN-KOPS, supra note 38, at 36, 38. Eight
out of thirteen of the Boston Strangler's victims were over 55 years old. Id. at
36. Rapes of male victims do not occur only in institutional settings as people
[Vol. 69:395
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rapes43 and are motivated primarily by violence and hatred to-
ward women rather than uncontrollable sexual desires.44 Fur-
thermore, a majority of rapes occur indoors45 and the victim
often knows the assailant.46 An overwhelming majority of
rapes are intraracial, not interracial.47 Finally, rape does count,
even if the woman is not a virgin: the psychological and physi-
cal trauma of rape is not less for women who have had consen-
sual intercourse.4 s
imagine. See, e.g., Forman, Reported Male Rape, 7 VIcrsoLOGY 235, 235 (1982)
(5.7% of rapes reported to the Columbia, S.C., police department in a 24-month
period involved male victims); Groth & Burgess, Male Rape: Offenders and
Victims, 137 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 806 (1980) (study of male rape in a commu-
nity setting).
43. Amir, in his leading study of the patterns of rape, found that 58% of
rapes by single individuals were planned, 90% of group rapes were planned,
and 83% of pair rapes were planned. M. A?6m, supra note 40, at 143.
44. See N. GROTH, MEN WHO RAPE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE OFFENDER
2, 12-13 (1979). Indeed, one out of every five reported rapes involves a brutal
beating. M. AmI, supra note 40, at 155. Twenty-seven percent involve sexual
humiliation, such as fellatio, cunnilingus, pederasty, use of prophylactics, and
repeated intercourse. Id. at 159. Moreover, some studies suggest that the psy-
chological profile of rapists is basically average except that they are more ag-
gressive, impulsive, and violent. Such apparent normality may contribute to
the low conviction rate for rape, as Feild and Bienen explain:
Assuming that rapists appear on the surface to be normal and thus do
not conform to many jurors' expectations, the severity of punishment
required by many state rape laws may actually work in favor of the
defendant. For example, if jurors think of a stereotypic rapist as be-
ing a psychopathic degenerate, when confronted with an individual
who does not look like their conceptions, the jury may acquit because
they perceive the mandatory penalty as too severe for the individual
given the offense.
H. FEiLD & L. BmNEN, supra note 41, at 56. Perhaps the most distressing of
the research on rape is a study by Neil Malamuth in which 35% of male col-
lege student respondents indicated at least some likelihood that they would
rape a woman if there were no possibility that they would be caught.
Malamuth, Rape Proclivity Among Males, J. SOC. ISSUES, Fall 1981, at 4.
45. L FEmD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 78. Amir found a significant
relationship between the place of initial meeting between the victim and of-
fender and the place where the crime took place. See M. AMIR, supra note 40,
at 144-45.
46. M. AMI, supra note 40, at 234-35; H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note
41, at 76-77. See generally M. A'mH, supra note 40, at 229-52 (interpersonal re-
lationships between victim and offender).
47. M. AMm, supra note 40, at 13, 44-45; see also H. FEILD & L. BIENEN,
supra note 41, at 80; J. WILLIAMS & K. HOLMES, supra note 33, at 80.
48. Studies on the psychological trauma of rape show that previous sexual
experience does not insulate women from the trauma of rape. See infra text
accompanying notes 124-36. Suggesting that it might is another example of
how people confuse voluntary sexual intercourse with the force and violence
of rape. A person who is mugged and forced to relinquish his wallet under
threat of injury or death surely feels the trauma of the mugging even though
1985]
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Despite this evidence, however, the rape mythology per-
sists, and recent studies reveal that rape myths insidiously in-
fect the minds of jurors, judges, and others who deal with rape
and its victims.49 The empirical studies5O show that judges, ju-
rors, and the public know very little about rape and that much
of what they believe about it is wrong.5 1 One of the most com-
mon and most damaging beliefs is that rape victims "ask for it,"
that their actions or appearance cause the rape. Believing that
myth, jurors often attribute fault to the victim for precipitating
the rape and then refuse to convict the alleged assailant.52 Su-
he has, on prior occasions, voluntarily given money to others. This trauma Is
no less if the robbery is committed by someone the man knows or to whom he
has previously given money. Indeed, the trauma may be worse when it is
caused by someone the victim knows and trusts.
49. The cost of the rape mythology is key to the arguments of this Article.
Presumably, myths affect judges and jurors in many areas of the law besides
rape, though rape mythology may be especially rich in emotion and detail.
Myths are not necessarily inaccurate, and even inaccurate myths may be
harmless or even desirable when they reflect a positive social interest or facili-
tate positive social ends. When, however, a myth not only is erroneous but
also produces identified, harmful results that frustrate articulated-i.e., statu-
tory-social interests, it must be confronted and replaced by facts.
50. The results of these studies defy pat generalizations because each
study considers different populations and controls for different variables. See,
e.g., H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 88-89; H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY (1971); J. WILLIAMS & K. HOLMES, supra note 33. Never-
theless, common themes emerge in the studies that support the conclusions of
this Article.
51. H. FEILD & L. BEINEN, supra note 41, at 89. Feild and Beinen col-
lected data from a total of 1,448 respondents, including citizens (1,056), patrol
police officers (254), convicted rapists (20), and rape crisis center counselors
(118). 1& at 88. They administered an "Attitudes Toward Rape" questionnaire
and a "Rape Knowledge Test" to all of the respondents. The results on the
attitude questionnaire revealed significant differences among the respondents
on certain dimensions of rape perceptions: rape crisis counselors' perceptions
of rape were "quite different" from the other three groups; the perceptions of
citizens and police were the most similar. Sex, race, and marital status were
the most important predictors of rape attitudes for the total sample. Within
each group, other characteristics, such as attitudes toward women and their
roles in society, were equally signficant. Id. at 88-89.
The average score of the respondents on the Rape Knowledge Test was
less than four items correct on a fourteen-item test. Rape crisis counselors,
however, "scored significantly higher" than all other groups. The citizens and
police scored similarly; the rapists scored "significantly lower" than all other
groups. The researchers found a correlation between some dimensions of atti-
tudes toward rape and knowledge about rape, leading them to conclude that
"citizens' attitudes about rape might be modified by providing them with infor-
mation on the factual aspects of rape." Id.
52. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 50, at 249-57. Judges have in-
ferred an "assumption of risk" from the facts that the victim and the defend-
ant were formerly married, that the victim had been drinking with the
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san Brownmiller's Against Our Will offers a feminist interpre-
tation of the phenomenon of victim blaming and the low
conviction rate in rape cases:
[J]uries are allies of male defendants and enemies of female com-
plainants for reasons that run deeper than their poor grasp of the law
or their predominantly male composition. They are composed of citi-
zens who believe the many myths about rape, and they judge the fe-
male according to these cherished myths.5 3
Other studies and cases support Brownmiller's views about
the effect of myths on jurors. In a study involving a hypotheti-
cal consent-defense case, when the victim's prior sexual history
was admitted, the jurors inferred victim consent, carefully and
unfavorably scrutinized her credibility and moral character,
and attributed responsibility to her.54 Such inferences are not
defendant, that the victim entered a car with the defendant, that the victim
was twice married and divorced, that the victim had had prior intercourse with
the defendant (even though the rape was "savage" and the victim's jaw was
fractured in two places), and that the victim had two illegitimate children and
the defendant alleged she was a prostitute (even though the rape was brutal).
Id. at 250-51.
Kalven and Zeisel described as "startling" the jury verdict patterns in
"simple rape," i.e., cases in which there is only one assailant, he Is known to
the victim, and there is no evidence of extrinsic violence:
The jury convicts of rape in just 3 of 42 cases of simple rape: further,
the percentage of disagreement with the judge on the major charge is
virtually 100 percent (201/2 out of 22) .... [T]he jury chooses to
redefine the crime of rape in terms of its notions of assumption of
risk. Where it perceives an assumption of risk the jury, if given the
option of finding the defendant guilty of a lesser crime, will fre-
quently do so. It is thus saying not that the defendant has done noth-
ing, but rather that what he has done does not deserve the distinctive
opprobrium of rape. If forced to choose in these cases between total
acquittal and finding the defendant guilty of rape, the jury will usu-
ally choose acquittal as the lesser evil.
Id at 253-54 (footnote omitted). These findings suggest a policy reason favor-
ing the gradation of sexual assault offenses. If juries refuse to convict despite
criminal laws that do not include assumption of risk as a defense, the state leg-
islature, by making the penalty less harsh, may increase the number of convic-
tions for "simple rape" cases. An argument against such legal reform is that it
may reinforce an "assumption of risk" attitude toward rape, and it thus may
not significantly deter sexual assaults that victims perceive and experience as
rape and that cause consequences as devastating as "nonsimple" rape.
See also H. FED & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 54 (66% of citizens who
responded to their survey saw rape as being provoked by women's behavior or
appearance).
53. S. BROWNMjLLER, supra note 33, at 373.
54. Borgida & White, Social Perception of Rape Victims, 2 LAw & HUM.
BEHAVIOR 339, 349 (1978); see also H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 119.
Jurors also believe the myth that if she said "yes" before, she said "yes"
again. This is a variation of the myth that rape doesn't count unless the victim
is a virgin. See supra text accompanying note 48. Some jurisdictions now try
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confined to hypotheticals. In one case reported by Kalven and
Zeisel in their study of juries, the jury acquitted a young de-
fendant charged with raping a seventeen-year-old girl. The
judge explained the verdict thus: "A group of young people on
a beer drinking party. The jury figured the girl asked for what
she got."55
Jurors are not unique in relying on common stereotypes
about rape to determine if rape occurred in a specific situation.
Some judges also decide whether an alleged rape is a "real
rape" based on rape mythology and stereotypes.5 6 For example,
a Philadelphia study found several judges quoting Lord Hale's
bromide that rape is the easiest crime to allege and the hardest
to prove.5 7 Their responses indicated a belief in three catego-
ries of rape cases: cases involving what they considered to be
"genuine victims," for example, victims of stranger rapes in an
alley; "consensual intercourse" cases, involving victims who
"asked for it," for example, by allowing the stranger to drive
them home; and "vindictive female" cases, where the inter-
course was either totally consensual or never occurred, for ex-
ample, where the woman tired of her boyfriend or husband.
The judges referred to the second category of cases as "friendly
rape," "felonious gallantry," "assault with failure to please,"
and "breach of contract."58
Indeed, to find jurors or judges without a victim-blaming
attitude toward rape may be very difficult because many mem-
bers of the public share this attitude. A 1978 study of attitudes
toward rape showed that sixty-nine percent of those polled in a
to counter this myth through rape shield statutes that exclude from evidence
testimony regarding the victim's sexual history. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412;
Borgida & White, supra, at 339. The myth, however, is not dispelled by such
statutes; it is merely controlled. Other rape myths persist and are not con-
trolled by appropriate jury instructions, expert testimony, or other attempts to
disabuse the fact finder of mistaken and prejudicial assumptions.
55. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 50, at 249-50.
56. Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303,
303-07 (1974). Doctors also fall victim to stereotyping. See, e.g., Dowd, Rape:
The Sexual Weapon, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 27, 29.
57. Bohmer interviewed 38 Philadelphia judges who had handled rape
cases. Bohmer, supra note 56, at 304. For further discussion of Lord Hale's
comment, see infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
58. Id. at 304-05. In a similar vein, Illinois Criminal Judge Christy Berkos
explained his lenient sentence of Brad Lieberman, a previously convicted rap-
ist who pleaded guilty to five additional rape charges, as follows: "Lieberman
had done things that did hurt the women, but fortunately he did not hurt the
women physically by breaking their heads or other things we see. He didn't
cut their breasts off, for instance." Dowd, supra note 56, at 29.
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random sample of 600 adults believed that in the majority of
rapes, the victim was promiscuous or had a bad reputation.5 9
Another study found that nearly one-third of the respondents
believed that the degree of a woman's resistance should play a
major factor in deciding whether a rape had occurred and over
half indicated that a woman should do everything she can to
resist.60
The studies also show that the physical characteristics of
both the victim and the rapist influence the jurors' attitudes to-
ward rape. Black defendants typically receive harsher treat-
ment than white defendants, especially when the victim is
white and attractive,61 whereas both black and white defend-
59. Burt & Estep, Who Is A Victim? Definitional Problems in Sexual
Victimization, 6 VICnOLOGY 15, 24 (1981). One-third of those polled believed
that a woman who gets raped while hitchhiking gets what she deserves and
half believed that a woman who goes to the home of a man on the first date
implies she is willing to have sex. More than half of the respondents believed
that 50% or more of reported rapes were not really rapes and that the victim
was either angry with the man or was pregnant and wanted to protect her own
reputation. I&L at 20.
60. H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 56. Thirty-four percent of the
respondents
tended to support the sexist logic behind many of the rape laws as
they said it should be difficult to prove a rape in order to protect the
male. Such reasoning is apparently based on the idea that rape is a
charge easy to make but difficult to defend against even though the
defendant is innocent.
Id (citation omitted); see infra text accompanying notes 94-96. This same atti-
tude affected conviction rates; Feild and Bienen found that when jurors per-
ceived that the victim precipitated or encouraged the attack, they were lenient
with the defendant. H. FELD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 119.
61. H. FEILD & L. BmNEN, supra note 41, at 117-18. The problem of ra-
cism and rape is pervasive and significant but is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. One writer who has examined the issue concludes, inter alia, that the
serious treatment the law has given the rape of a white woman by a black man
is not because the woman was coerced into intercourse but because it threat-
ens white men's power over white women and black men. See Wriggins, Rape,
Racism, and the Law, 6 HARv. WOnMEN'S L.J. 103, 116 (1983). Wriggins also as-
serts that by treating the rape combination of black man/white woman more
harshly, the legal system has implicitly condoned any rape of a black woman
and most coerced sex experienced by white women. Id. at 116-17. The history
of this harsher treatment is long and conspicuous, as evidenced by the follow-
ing figures:
Between 1930 and 1967, thirty-six percent of the Black men who were
convicted of raping a white woman were executed. In stark contrast,
only two percent of all defendants convicted of rape involving other
racial combinations were executed. As a result of such disparate
treatment, eighty-nine percent of the men executed for rape in this
country were Black.
Id- at 112-13 (footnotes omitted).
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ants receive more lenient treatment when the victim is black.02
Attractive victims or victims with sexual experience more often
are viewed as precipitators than victims. 63
The attitudes toward rape and rape victims reflected in
these studies may have several explanations. People may not
consider rape a serious crime unless there is physical injury.64
62. Wriggins, supra note 61, at 141-42. See generally B. HOOKS, AIN'T I A
WOMAN 35-37, 51-62 (1981) (discussing sexism, racism, and the rape of black
women).
63. See H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 103, 128-31, 134-35. The
vast majority of the respondents in the Williams and Holmes study viewed
rape as a behavioral problem. They believed that the rapist was mentally ill
and that his attitudes and actions created the primary behavioral problem. J.
WILLIAMS & K. HOLMES, supra note 33, at 123. They also believed, however,
that the victim posed a secondary behavioral problem, because she had con-
tributed to the problem of rape through inappropriate behavior and/or appear-
ance. Id.; see also H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 54. Few
respondents believed that societal problems or sex-role problems were a cause
of rape. J. WILLIAMS & K. HOLMES, supra note 33, at 123. Blaming rape on
individual pathologies and conduct, rather than on systemic social problems, is
one way people distance themselves from the actors and victims and thus deny
any responsibility for the problem or for its prevention. Moreover, the crimi-
nal law focuses on bad acts committed by individuals or entities, not by "soci-
ety."
The respondents' evaluations of the credibility of various rape situations
are not surprising. The most credible situation was the street rape, with a
weapon and victim injuries; the second and third most credible situations were
either a street rape with no weapon or a date rape with a weapon; the fourth
most credible situation was the rape of a prostitute by a stranger with a
weapon and victim injuries or, among minority men, the rape of a bar pick-up
with a weapon. Lowest in credibility were husband-wife rapes and rapes of
women who met their assailant in a bar where no weapon was used. Id. at 128.
Williams and Holmes concluded that the greater the perceived or actual
risk of an accusation of rape to a certain age, sex, racial/ethnic group, the
more "conservative" or "nonfeminist" the group's attitudes are toward rape.
For example, young men would more likely blame the victim for the assault
than would older women. Williams and Holmes also found that individuals
without rigid sex-role attitudes tended to believe the victim and not assume
female fault. Id. at 168.
The Williams and Holmes data underscore that "consent rape" victims
may face jury disbelief and stereotyping, especially if the jury consists of
young minority males. The data also corroborate the "assumption of risk"
phenomenon identified by Kalven and Zeisel, see supra note 52, and link the
tendency to attribute fault to the victim with conservative sex-role attitudes.
The data further suggest that the fear of false convictions or of discriminato-
rily harsh sentences may affect respondents' attitudes about rape, such as their
definition of the crime and their willingness to prosecute and to attribute fault
to the victim. Finally, and importantly, the data intimate that a change in sex-
role attitudes would produce a positive change in attitudes toward rape. Id. at
168-69.
64. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 33, at 391. A recent rape trial in
Lexington, Virginia, provides an example of this phenomenon, though the out-
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They may blame the victims of the crime in order to preserve a
sense of a "just world" and of control and safety for nonvic-
tims.6 5 Other people may confuse their own sexual activities
and desires with those of the rapist and view rape as an act of
sex rather than violence. People with rigid and circumscribed
notions of acceptable female behavior may blame victims for
precipitating the crime.66 Others, especially those who are vul-
nerable to discriminatorily harsh treatment by the legal sys-
tem, may be skeptical of all rapes because they believe it is easy
to lie about rape. Whatever the reason, people's attitudes to-
come of the trial was a conviction. A young male was charged with the rape of
a college student at a campus fraternity party. The rape occurred in the early
morning. The woman, a student at a neighboring women's college, attended a
fraternity party where she drank heavily and fell asleep in a guest room in the
fraternity. The defendant entered the house, found her sleeping, and raped
her. Her cries awakened two fraternity members, who entered the room and
lifted the defendant off of the woman. Instead of calling the police, however,
these men threw the defendant out of the house. The defendant returned to
the house shortly thereafter because he had forgotten his hat and wanted it
returned. Commonwealth v. Tinsley, Rockbridge County Cir. Ct., Virginia
(1984).
The responses of the fraternity men and of the defendant can only be de-
scribed as mystifying. One compelling inference is that none of them per-
ceived what the defendant had done as serious enough to request or fear police
involvement.
This perception seems to have ancient roots. Historical research by Pro-
fessor Roger Groot shows that although rape was a crime in Angevin times,
there is no record of a rape defendant being put to the usual proof or pun-
ished. He concludes that the reason for this "remarkable fact" is that "rape
was not perceived as a sufficiently serious violation of the social order to call
for a judicial response." Groot, The Crime of Rape temp. Richard I and John
(unpublished manuscript, available at Washington and Lee University School
of Law).
65. See, eg., M LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WoRLD: A FUNDA.tiENTAL
DELUSION 2 (1980) (describing people's need to rationalize injustice by conclud-
ing the victim somehow invited her fate); Lerner & Simmons, Observers Reac-
tion to the "Innocent Victim'" Compassion or Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PsYCHOLOGY 203 (1966) (studies support hypothesis that rejection and de-
valuation of a suffering victim are primarily based on the observer's need to
believe in a just world).
66. The New Bedford gang-rape trial provides an example of this notion.
The alleged victim testified that she was gang-raped on a pool table at Big
Dan's bar as onlookers cheered. Defense lawyers attempted to impeach the
woman's credibility by questioning her about a hospital report that showed she
had complained of being raped two years before the barroom incident. The
judge excluded the evidence as irrelevant. In explaining why he felt the evi-
dence was relevant, the defense lawyer was quoted as saying, "'We're just try-
ing to say- how many people get raped twice in such a short time when they
are living with a man?' With a live-in boyfriend, he said, 'I shouldn't think
she'd be out running around the streets getting raped.' Wash. Post, Feb. 29,
1984, at All, col. 3.
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ward rape reflect misunderstandings, fear, and prejudice, and
jurors and judges are as susceptible to those factually incorrect
and legally irrelevant myths as the general population.67
C. SEDUCTION, FALSE ACCUSATION, OR RAPE?
The perception of rape as different from other violent
crimes is further reinforced by the belief that only a fine line
separates rape from seduction and by the fear that rape is par-
ticularly susceptible to false accusations. As the following anal-
ysis shows, however, these problems need be no greater for
rape than for other crimes and are probably exaggerated be-
cause of the continuing belief in rape myths.
A fact finder may sometimes have difficulty distinguishing
seduction from rape because the difference hinges solely on the
perception and intent of the participants, direct evidence of
which is impossible to obtain.68 Society's acceptance of certain
coercive sexuality as normal sexual behavior makes it possible
67. See H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 45-49. Experience with
myths in other disciplines suggests how formidable the task of demytholo-
gizing may be. Early theories about human anatomy were based on the work
of Galen, born c. 130 A.D. Galen, although he had dissected Barbary apes,
probably never performed a human dissection. His theories about human
anatomy were, in some respects, visionary and erroneous. For example, Galen
believed that the heart produced "vital spirits" that were changed to "animal
spirits" by the blood.
Galen's theories persisted for 1300 years, and any evidence inconsistent
with Galenic teaching was rejected. In approximately 1533, a man named
Sylvius was given permission to dissect bodies of criminals. He was observed
by a young student named Vesalius, who discovered that despite the inconsis-
tencies between the anatomy of the cadavers and Galen's notions about anat-
omy, Sylvius clung to Galen's ideas and "sought to bridge over the mistakes of
the master." D. ATKINSON, MAGIC, MYTH AND MEDICINE 153 (1956). Vesalius
decided that Sylvius was not a proper teacher and left to conduct his own re-
search and writing. Vesalius's work discrediting Galen's theories was ridi-
culed, however, and Vesalius was denounced as a heretic. Id. at 154.
68. Wiener, supra note 31, at 146-47. Here again, however, the problem is
not unique to rape, although it may be more pronounced. Truth or reality is a
matter of interpretation and direct evidence of what actually occurred in any
crime is impossible to obtain. With rape, this problem is compounded because
the crime is defined according to the participants' interpretation of their acts.
Thus, investigation must show what actually happened and what the parties
actually thought happened. At neither level, however, is it possible to know
what actually occurred.
If people cannot ever know the "truth," then legal decisions, like all other
decisions, must be based on something else. This "something else" is a balance
of interests. This Article argues that people's interpretation of consent-rape
fact situations is based on a flawed theory about rape and reflects a balance of
interests that should be rejected because it is socially disadvantageous and in-
consistent with the theory and ideology of rape the criminal law prescribes.
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to regard even extreme aggressive behavior by the male partici-
pant as seduction rather than rape.69 Participants also may
misinterpret the meaning and intent of the dating behavior or
erotic play of their partners,7 0 further confounding attempts to
distinguish between seduction and rape. Such misinterpreta-
tions may result from different perceptions or from the partici-
pants' failure to communicate clearly their intentions and
desires to their partners.
Drawing the legal line between seduction and rape involves
two important and perhaps conflicting policy interests: protect-
ing individual freedom from coerced submission to sex7 ' and
avoiding criminal liability for someone who could not reason-
ably have known he was committing a felony. Most jurisdic-
tions strike the balance between the policies in favor of the
latter by evaluating whether an act is seduction or rape in
terms of the defendant's belief about the victim's desires rather
than in terms of the victim's actual state of mind. Thus, a
male's mistaken but "reasonable" perception that a woman
wants, expects, or invites sex frees the male from liability. Bas-
ing reasonableness on the defendant's perception of the victim's
behavior and the surrounding circumstances, however, puts a
heavy burden on the victim. To the extent that society accepts
coercive sex as normal and treats certain nonverbal or ambigu-
ous verbal communications by a female as consent or assump-
tion of risk, a woman who did not intend to consent and who
never said "yes" may find that the law says that she was not
raped.72 Such an approach also subjects her behavior, rather
69. Id at 147. A recent example of this is State v. Radjenovich, 138 Ariz.
270, 674 P.2d 333 (1983), in which the defendant had bitten the alleged victim's
thigh, scratched her back, and offered oral sex. He defended the charge of
rape on the basis of her consent. To corroborate the defense, he intended to
call a psychologist who specialized in sex counseling to testify that the biting,
scratching, and offering of oral sex were consistent with normal sexual behav-
ior. Id- at 272, 674 P.2d at 335.
70. Wiener, supra note 31, at 147. For example, a male may believe that a
female's "no" means "yes," or that consent to petting is consent to intercourse,
or that agreeing to a drink or a ride home is consent to intercourse. The fe-
male may misinterpret certain male cues as evidencing sensitivity to her lim-
its, or she may fail to express those limits in a clear manner.
71. See State v. Greensweig, 103 Idaho 50, 53, 644 P.2d 372, 375 (1982)
("[W]e deem it beyond dispute that protection of women from rape is a legiti-
mate, important state objective. Rape is a peculiarly degrading form of as-
sault. It often results in a profound, enduring emotional trauma that only its
victims can fully comprehend.").
72. Likewise, the opinion of an expert on rape that the victim's resistance
was enough to make "reasonably manifest" her refusal is irrelevant. People v.
Guthreau, 102 Cal. App. 3d 436, 162 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1980), emphasized that the
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than the perpetrator's, to close scrutiny by the defense lawyer,
the fact finder, and the community.7 3
The effect of this approach during a trial is well-demon-
strated by the 1980 Utah decision in State v. Myers.7 4 The facts
of Myers are fairly unremarkable; the result and reasoning of
the case are not. The defendant had approached the victim and
another woman in a parking lot of a technical college and in-
vited them to breakfast. They agreed, and the three had break-
fast at a nearby cafe.7 5 After breakfast they went to a private
club for drinks. Around 1:00 p.m. the victim left to change into
her work clothes, a "somewhat scanty" costume that she wore
for her job as a cocktail waitress at another club.76 When she
returned, her friend left the bar, and the victim and the defend-
ant remained at the club until after midnight. The manager of
the club testified that he observed the victim and the defendant
"petting" and that he saw the victim lying with her head in the
defendant's lap.77
After they left the club, the defendant and the victim
critical inquiry is whether the victim's resistance was enough to show her re-
fusal to the defendant. The defendant's perception, and not the victim's or any
expert's, is the key. Id. at 44, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 378; see also People v. Clark,
109 Cal. App. 3d 88, 92-94, 167 Cal. Rptr. 51, 53-54 (1980) (expert's explanation
of reasonableness of complainant's passive conduct constituted reversible error
when case turned on credibility on consent issue). But see Perez v. State, 653
S.W.2d 878, 882 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983) (admitting testimony of a rape crisis
center lecturer to explain victim's passive resistance to the defendant).
73. Wiener offers a challenging proposal redefining consent that might
change this result. She argues that the communication burden should shift, so
that men would be responsible for ascertaining consent and held accountable
if they did not secure consent before intercourse. The law's focus, Wiener
maintains, should not be on the reasonableness of the offender's initial behav-
ior, the victim's fear, or her resistance or demonstration of lack of consent.
Wiener, supra note 31, at 155. Rather, the court should examine one behavior
only: the victim's overt consent. Id. at 158. The purpose of rape laws, she
adds, is to deter behavior and protect women's freedom of choice. These inter-
ests outweigh any benefit in allowing men to act in accordance with current
"norms" of sexual behavior. Id at 159-60. In response to any argument that
criminal law should not punish when the actor has neither subjective intent
nor actual knowledge that his actions are unlawful, she concludes that punish-
ment under these circumstances is not novel and that "requiring members of
society to meet legally prescribed behavior standards is consistent with the
purposes of our criminal law system." Id. at 158 (citing O.W. HoLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 41-43 (M. Howe ed. 1968)).
74. 606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980).
75. Id at 251.
76. Id. The facts indicate she never went to work at the other club that
night.
77. Id. This petting apparently consisted of kissing and hugging. Id. at
252.
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drove the victim's car to a motel parking lot. The victim had
intended to drive the defendant to his car, but he asked her to
take him to the motel because he wanted to see a friend. Once
there, he told the victim she could make more money working
as a prostitute for him than as a waitress and offered to pay her
to have sex with him.78 She refused, at which point he became
angry and called her names. 79 She tried to escape but he
grabbed her by the hair, dragged her back into the car, and
raped her.8O Witnesses who saw the victim after the incident
testified that "her face and eyes were swollen, her skirt was
ripped and the front of her blouse was torn open[,] ... a large
strip of her hair was missing from her head and.., she had
had red marks on her arm."81
The defendant claimed the intercourse was consensual and
that the victim only complained because she was not paid. The
jury disagreed and convicted the defendant of rape.A2 The
judge, however, entered an order in arrest of judgment and
made the following remarks:
I cannot close my eyes to the fact situation that for this long period
during that day these two people were in friendly contact association,
necking with each other and participating in the kind of activity that
ultimately might well lead to sexual relations .... [I]f under those
facts and circumstances a man has sexual intercourse with a woman,
it seems to me, even if it can technically be said without her consent,
I don't think we can, in any sense of the word, justify imposing a
prison sentence upon him on that fact situation.83
The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed with the trial judge.
The law, the court observed, does not justify the conclusion
that a woman loses her right to reject future advances once she
has accepted drinks and food from a man or kissed and hugged
him for a period of time.8 4 Moreover, although the jury may
have considered the victim indiscreet, they did not believe her
conduct justified the defendant's violence. The jury verdict
78. Id at 251.
79. IA. at 252.
80. Id.
81. IC
82. Id. The jury may have been persuaded by the evidence of extrinsic
physical injury.
83. Id. (emphasis added by the appellate court).
84. Id. A similar sentiment was expressed by a Massachusetts judge in
sentencing three members of a rock band for raping a woman aboard their
tour bus. Middlesex Superior Court Judge Robert Barton stated: "No longer
will society accept the facts [sic] that a woman, even if she may initially act in
a seductive or compromising manner, has waived her right to say no at any
further time." Tampa Tribune, Mar. 20, 1984, at 13-A, col. 4.
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thus was ordered reinstated and the case was remanded for
sentencing within the statutory limits.85
The Utah Supreme Court is not alone in demanding overt
consent for a successful consent defense to a rape charge. Leg-
islatures are also giving greater weight to the interest in pre-
serving individual freedom from coercive sex by focusing on the
"overt consent" of the victim and acknowledging her right to
say "no" to specific acts even when she has consented to other
acts that might, under a more traditional and restrictive view of
female behavior, be construed as general permission for inter-
course.8 6 For example, Illinois's new sexual assault statute de-
fines consent as words or actions by a person indicating "a
freely given agreement to the act of sexual penetration or sex-
ual conduct in question." 87 This statute reflects a concern for
the right of a person to control not only the general tenor of an
encounter but also the specific acts engaged in within that
encounter.
Both the Myers case and the Illinois statute suggest an ap-
proach that clarifies the distinction between rape and seduc-
tion. Although credibility will always loom large in such cases,
the participants need not fear the law if they have fulfilled
their affirmative duty to ascertain overt consent by their part-
ners rather than simply surmising such consent. Participants
can no longer define consent according to what other people
might do or want under the circumstances. They must learn
what this partner wants, regardless of what the "reasonable
man or woman" might desire.88 To redefine a "reasonable per-
ception" that a woman consents to intercourse in a way that re-
quires the man to obtain overt consent would promote the
85. Myers, 606 P.2d at 253.
86. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 31, at 153-60 (discussing various changes
in state rape consent tests); Note, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of
Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 645 (1976) (suggesting current confusion sur-
rounding rape consent standards could be remedied through the adoption of a
standard focusing on the complaining witness's effective consent).
87. Act of Mar. 9, 1983, P.A. 83-1067, § 1, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 12-17
(Smith-Hurd 1983).
88. This result may seem offensive to people who believe in a little mys-
tery, even danger, in foreplay. Their inevitable argument will be that statutes
like that of Illinois will force all sex partners to submit a questionnaire to each
other before each act of intercourse, or to sign a consent form. Such objections
to a specific consent approach to rape, however, are disingenuous and insensi-
tive. The Illinois statute reasonably would not apply to sexual intercourse be-
tween consenting and familiar partners; the argument that it might be twisted
to apply to these acts ignores the scope of the problem of rape and the purpose
of the statute.
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policy interest in protecting women from rape8 9 without unjus-
tifiable harm to defendants: they need only ask9o and not hood-
89. Indeed, more is at stake than protecting women from rape. When a
woman's behavior is construed as an "invitation to rape" whenever she goes
out for a drink alone, kisses a man, or agrees to enter his automobile, the re-
sults are a circumscribed and stunted existence for women and unnecessary
hostility and distrust between men and women.
American jurisdictions are not alone in their movement toward a consent
standard more protective of individuals' sexual integrity. Tasmania places the
burden on the accused to show that a mistaken belief in consent was based on
reasonable grounds. Warner, The Mental Element and Consent under the Neo
'Rape" Laws, 7 CmiM. L.J. 245, 249 (1983) (citing Martin [1963] Tas. S.R.).
Warner, noting that this rule has been criticized as unfair to the accused, re-
sponds: "This [criticism] indicates an obsessive concern with rights of the of-
fender and the need for a 'guilty mind,' neglecting the need to protect victims
from the physical and psychological trauma of sexual assault. A person who
believes unreasonably in consent is not without culpability." Id. She also cites
the arguments of Lord Cross of Chelsea:
[I]t can be argued with force that it is only fair to the woman and not
in the least unfair to the man that he should be under a duty to take
reasonable care that she is consenting to the intercourse and be at the
risk of prosecution if he fails to take such care.
Id. at 249 (quoting Morgan [1976] A.C. 182, 203).
90. The hardest fact situations make this point, which is essentially a pol-
icy determination, most clearly. Assume that a man and woman meet in a bar,
dance, drink, and then leave together. They enter his automobile, where they
begin kissing, fondling, and hugging. He becomes excited; she then wants to
stop, maybe out of fear, or maybe out of cruelty. He proceeds, thinking she is
being coy. She says no. He construes this as insincere. She says, "Come on;
stop." He continues and, applying physical pressure sufficient to leave marks
but not bruises, has intercourse with her. Was the specific act with her con-
sent? The facts suggest the answer is no.
What if, however, she had said nothing? She was thinking "no" and now
says it was against her will, but she then said nothing. Could he reasonably
assume she was consenting to the further act of intercourse? The facts suggest
the answer is yes. Her behavior up to the moment the acts escalated to inter-
course communicated consent. But why did he not ask if she wanted to take
the additional step from kissing and fondling to intercourse? Why don't we
hear questioning as follows in rape trials:
Q: And then you left the bar with her?
A Yes.
Q: Although you never met her before this night?
A. Yes.
Q: And you had only talked to her for two hours?
A- Yes.Q: Why did you leave the bar with this stranger?
A- To make out.
Q: What do you mean, to make out?
A. You know, make out.
Q: Was it your intention to have sexual intercourse with this
stranger?
A: Well, I wanted to.
Q: Did you ask her then if she wanted to have intercourse?
A. No.
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wink, bludgeon, blindside, or proceed without conscious regard
Q: Then what happened?
A: We went to my car and began kissing.
Q: Did you ask her if she wanted to go to the car and kiss?
A: Yeah.
Q: What did you say?
A: I said-let's go to my car where we can have some fun.
Q: What did she say?
A: She smiled and said "okay."
Q: Then what happened?
A: We went to the car and did it.Q: Did what?
A: Made out.
Q: Please be specific. What did you do first?
A: Well, I started kissing her.
Q: Did she say she wanted to kiss you?
A: No, but she kissed me back.
Q: Then what happened?
A: We were kissing and petting.
Q: Both of you?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you ask her if she wanted this?
A: No, but I could tell she liked it.
Q: How do you know she enjoyed it?
A: Well, she was kissing and petting back.
Q: For how long?
A: Maybe twenty minutes.
Q: And then what happened?
A: Well, eventually I took her panties off.
Q: Did you ask her if she wanted this before you removed them?
A: No.
Q: Did she say anything then?
A: No.
Q: Did she act like she enjoyed it then?
A: I don't remember.
Q: Did she resist?
A: A little, but she didn't want me to stop.Q: So, you took this stranger, whom you met only two hours before,
into your automobile, kissed and fondled with her, and then removed
her panties without asking her permission?
A: She wanted me to.
Q: How do you know that?
A: Because she didn't stop me.
Q: But you said she resisted a little.
A: A little.
Q: Is that what you call consent? Not stopping you?
A: Yeah. I assumed she wanted it.
Q: But you didn't know, did you, what she was thinking at that time?
A: No. I can't read minds.Q: That's right, you can't. And you never asked what she wanted, did
you?
A: I didn't think I needed to. Her actions spoke for her.Q: Which actions? Be specific.
A: Well, the kissing and fondling and not stopping me when I took
off her pants.
Q: Would you have stopped then if she had said no?
A: Well, sure. But she didn't.
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for their partners' wishes.91
Even fact finders who understand the distinction between
seduction and rape may be troubled by the fear that a woman
may deliberately but falsely accuse a man of rape or uninten-
tionally fabricate such a charge.92 Again, the underlying notion
is that the lack of direct evidence or witnesses combines with
the heinous nature of the crime to make it likely that false ac-
cusations of rape will evade exposure more often than false ac-
cusations of other crimes.93 In short, people believe that liars,
hysterics, and pregnant girls who don't want to admit to con-
Q: But you admitted she resisted, and she now says she didn't want to
have sexual intercourse.
A: Well, she's lying.
Q: How could you know what she wanted, if you only met two hours
before and you never asked her what she wanted?
A: Well, she seemed like she wanted it.
Q: But how could you know?
A. She kissed and stuff.
Q: Is kissing someone or touching them consent to sex?
A: Well, yeah. When you meet someone in a bar you take your
chances.
There is no sound public policy reason to allow this defendant to proceed with
sexual intercourse without being required first to obtain the woman's consent.
The legal standard in rape thus should focus on her overt consent and should
impose responsibility on the participant for securing overt consent.
This answer may be easier to reach under statutes with gradations of sex-
ual offenses, since the jury could find the defendant guilty of a lesser degree of
sexual assault. The more controversial approach is to find the defendant
guilty regardless of the availability of lesser degrees of rape. That is, unless
her behavior or words evidenced overt consent to the specific act, it was
"against her will." His mistaken belief that a stranger's general behavior, such
as kissing or hugging, meant that she wanted to have intercourse with him
will not exonerate him. Establishing whether that overt consent was given,
however, will remain a difficult question of credibility and perception.
Of course, this consent need not be verbal to be overt in the context of a
relationship, such as marriage, in which the parties have had prior consensual
intercourse and have developed nonverbal means of communicating their sex-
ual desires. But to require less than a verbal "yes" in the context of brief en-
counters, such as a first date, encourages coercive intercourse--an undeniably
harmful act-with no apparent social benefit.
91. As Margaret Sanger wrote over six decades ago,
A mutual and satisfied sexual act is of great benefit to the average
woman, the magnetism of it is health giving. When it is not desired
on the part of the woman and she has no response, it should not take
place.... [This is] degrading to the woman's finer sensibility, all the
marriage certificates on earth to the contrary notwithstanding.
IVL SANGER, FAMILY LM~ITATIoNs (1917).
92. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRALs AT COMMON LAW § 924a, at
737 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); infra text accompanying notes 94-114.
93. Berger, supra note 28, at 21-22.
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sensual intercourse will claim rape even though the sex was
consensual. As Lord Hale wrote over 300 years ago,
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely
and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be
remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so
innocent.94
Some writers see Hale's comment as an apt and important
reminder that a defendant might be wrongly accused,95 but
others cite it as an indictment of the law's insensitivity to the
victims of rape. 96 In the former category, Dean Wigmore de-
votes an entire section in his evidence treatise to the matter of
lying complainants.97 He describes various derangements, such
as hysteria, that could lead a woman to "cry rape"98 and con-
cludes that every female complainant who makes a sex offense
charge should be examined by a qualified physician regarding
her social history and mental makeup before the charge can go
to the jury.99
The authority cited by Wigmore that links these psycholog-
ical disorders with tendencies to make false accusations of rape
is a monograph written in 1915 that refers almost exclusively to
children00 and contains findings that have been rejected.O1
Also, Wigmore's medico-legal connection between female fan-
tasy and false accusations of rape is dubious. The theoretical
roots of this conclusion probably come from the works of psy-
94. 1 M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONE 635 (1646).
95. See 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 92, § 924a, at 737; Comment, Police
Discretion and the Judgment That a Crime Has Been Committed-Rape in
Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 277-80 (1968).
96. See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 33, at 369; Berger, supra note 28,
at 22; cf. Ross, supra note 28, at 712 (noting that Hale's original caveat was lim-
ited to uncorroborated complaints by minors but later was extended to cases
involving complainants of all ages).
97. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 92, § 924a.
98. Wigmore explains:
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant
young girls and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases.
Their psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent
defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly
by bad social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emo-
tional conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of con-
triving false charges of sexual offenses by men.
3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 92, § 924a, at 736.
99. Id. at 737.
100. Berger, supra note 28, at 28.
101. H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 200 n.108. The source was a
1915 monograph called Pathological Lying, now repudiated. Id.
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chiatrists such as Sigmund FreudlO2 and Helene Deutsch,103
whose theories have been criticized and challenged by other
psychiatrists. 0 4
Even if Freud and Deutsch were right, however, their con-
clusions are irrelevant to the law of rape because the fantasy
theories do not establish that these fantasies give rise to a sig-
nificant number of rape accusations.105 Moreover, as one com-
mentator has correctly observed, even if some women do suffer
from masochism and thus subtly place themselves at risk of be-
ing raped, "[i]n so doing they give the rapist his opportunity,
not a legal or moral excuse."los
Another writer who devotes considerable energy to false
102. Many of Freud's patients told him detailed stories of familial abuse
and incest, and he initially believed them. After some time, however, he de-
cided that the stories' prevalence argued against their reality and concluded
that they were fantasies, products of repressed sexuality. J. MASSON, THE AS.
SAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD'S SUPPRESSION THEORY 107-19 (1983).
103. Deutsch described various female masochism theories. See, e.g., 1 H.
DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 239-79 (1944-1945).
104. See, eg., J. MASSON, supra note 102, passim. Masson maintains that
Freud's reversal was motivated by self-protection: "[Wihat Freud had uncov-
ered in 1896-that, in many instances, children are the victims of sexual vio-
lence and abuse within their own families-became such a liability that he
literally had to banish it from his consciousness." Id. at xxii. A more recent
study of female rape fantasies indicates that linguistic ambiguities could con-
tribute to the confusion about women's fantasies. That author concludes that
women may refer to a fantasy as a "rape fantasy" when the facts of the fan-
tasy indicate she is fantasizing about seduction, not rape. When her fantasy
involves rape, the experience is negative, fearful, and nonerotic. See Kanin,
Female Rape Fantasies: A Victimization Study, 7 VIcrIMoLoGY 114, 119-20
(1982).
Deutsch's theory that women are more masochistic than men has been
similarly challenged. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 28, at 28-29 (questioning
both the theory and the causal link to rape); Kanin, supra note 104, at 116
(finding that women who engage in true rape fantasies undergo a negative,
fearful fantasy experience, whereas women who have seduction fantasies un-
dergo a pleasant, erotic fantasy experience); Waites, Female Masochism and
the Enforced Restriction of Choice, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 535, 537-39 (1978) (challeng-
ing the notion that female masochism has a biological basis).
105. Berger, supra note 28, at 28. Berger carefully addresses and rejects
the "cultural myths" about women that arise in sources ranging from the Bi-
ble to Freud. Id. at 22-29. Her discussion-buttressed by data, logic, and case
citations-demonstrates that "[c]ontrary to the Hale thesis, the balance of ad-
vantage in rape prosecutions tips rather markedly toward the defendant." Id.
at 29.
106. Id. at 28. Berger's approach is consistent with the specific consent the-
ory of rape discussed previously, see supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text,
and with a rejection of an assumption of risk analysis in the law of rape, see
supra note 52.
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accusations is James Macdonald.107 His book seems insensitive
to rape victims' 08 and its data have been questioned,109 but his
theories reflect and help perpetuate the mythology of rape.
Macdonald offers five major reasons for false rape accusations:
revenge, blackmail, protection of reputation, jealousy, and re-
pressed erotic wishes or fantasies.110 Although some women
might act on these motives by falsely accusing someone of rape,
at least three of these motives-revenge, blackmail, and jeal-
ousy-are equally plausible motives for false charges of theft,
assault, embezzlement, or other felonies. Moreover, "victims"
of these other crimes do not face the cultural biases that vic-
tims of rape do; thus there is more incentive to make a false
charge of another crime than of rape. Macdonald apparently
places more emphasis on the motives of revenge, blackmail, and
jealousy in rape cases because he views women as uncommonly
prone to these motives:
The woman who agrees to sexual intercourse after prolonged courting
and promise of marriage may become somewhat peevish when her
boyfriend stops calling on her. She may respond by threatening to re-
port to the police that he raped her unless he agrees to marry her.
She may, in fact, go to the police with a fabricated story of forcible
rape if the man fails to marry her.111
Such sexual stereotyping distorts Macdonald's treatment of
false accusations of rape and renders untrustworthy his obser-
vations about the role of revenge, jealousy, and blackmail.
Protection of reputation may motivate some women to
make false rape charges, though not to the extent Macdonald
imagines. Only four women in Macdonald's study gave reputa-
tion reasons-such as providing an explanation for an out-of-
wedlock pregnancy or for an extramarital encounter-for their
admittedly false charges of rape. This handful of cases, how-
ever, hardly justifies the pervasive conclusion that many wo-
107. J. MACDONALD, RAPE: OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 209 (1971); see
also Elliott, Rape Complainants' Sexual Experience with Third Parties, 1984
CRIM. L. REV. 4, 13-14 (similar assessment of the validity of rape claims).
108. The following is an example of Macdonald's unsympathetic view of
complainants: "Promiscuous wives, involved in divorce suits, sometimes make
false claims of rape to protect their reputation, especially when they anticipate
a courtroom battle over custody of their children." J. MACDONALD, supra note
107, at 205. But see C. HURSCH, supra note 27, at 82-87 (criticizing Macdonald).
109. Hursch notes that most of the reasons Macdonald lists for a woman to
"cry rape" come from an article written in 1918. C. HuRscH, supra note 27, at
85-86 (referring to R.F. Bronson, False Accusations of Rape, 14 AM. J. UROL-
OGY & SEXOLOGY 539 (1918)).
110. J. MACDONALD, supra note 107, at 202.
111. Id. at 204.
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men cry rape out of such motives.n 2 Moreover, because each of
the women Macdonald described admitted the falsehood in po-
lice questioning,1 1 3 undetected falsehoods are unlikely to be a
crucial factor in cases reaching the court. Social changes in the
fifteen years since Macdonald wrote his book also may have re-
duced the motives for a woman to lie in such circumstances;
single motherhood and extramarital affairs are far more com-
mon and less shattering of reputations than they once were. Fi-
nally, Macdonald's conclusion that false accusations arise from
the suppressed erotic wishes or fantasies of women suffers from
the same infirmities as Wigmore's assumptions about women
and rape.1 1 4
Critics of Hale, Wigmore, and Macdonald argue that rape is
not a charge easily made and cite statistics indicating that rape
is vastly underreported and, when reported, rarely results in a
conviction. A recent study on rape, citing 1980 Department of
Justice figures, noted:
In 1977, only half of reported rapes (and it is estimated that the actual
incidence of rape is three and one-half to nine times the reported
rate) resulted in arrests; 65 percent of those arrested were prosecuted,
112. Id at 204-07.
113. Id
114. Most of Macdonald's examples of accusers motivated by psychological
disorders are children, and the falsehoods were uncovered in police question-
ing. Id at 202-24. Of the remaining false reports described by Macdonald,
some were charges of rape that were neither concocted falsehoods nor mis-
taken perceptions about the difference between seduction and rape, as Mac-
donald claimed.
For example, Macdonald characterizes the following incident as a false
claim of rape:
A woman who claimed that she had been raped and assaulted later
acknowledged that she had agreed to have sexual intercourse with the
man for fifteen dollars. "He told me to get my clothes off. He told
me to lay down, so I did. So then he had this wax dill and tried put-
ting it in me. I said no and I pushed this thing out.... I got my coat
and purse and started walking toward the bathroom and he grabbed
me and hit me on the face and head and then he made me lay down
and... he put his penis through the rectum, so I told him that it
hurt real bad. So he told me to get dressed and I told him to forget
about the fifteen dollars.
Id at 217. Or consider this curious entry by Macdonald.
Some women have difficulty in breaking off love affairs. Often they
have ambivalent feelings toward the man and react ambivalently, one
day announcing that all is over and the next day permitting the man
to stay for dinner. When the discarded lover resorts to violence to ob-
tain the sexual relations previously readily available, the woman may
appeal to the police for help in her dilemma. She makes a report of
rape but neglects to mention her seductive-rejecting relationship and
prior acts of intercourse.
Id. at 208.
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and 40 percent of these had their cases dismissed or were
acquitted.115
Women are often reluctant to report rapes because of the
unique bias people have against victims of rape. They first
must face the police, who deem reports of rape to be "un-
founded," that is, not meriting police involvement, more often
than any other major felony.116 Then, even if the police do be-
lieve the victim and the case proceeds to trial, the victim may
face grueling cross-examination by the defense attorney. More-
over, perhaps because jurors apply an assumption of risk stan-
dard to the victim and scrutinize closely her behavior according
to rigid notions of acceptable female conduct, rape victims are
the least successful among all victims of violent crimes in prov-
ing their claims.117 Finally, rape victims who admit they were
raped often suffer in their personal relationships because ac-
quaintances, friends, and lovers sometimes withdraw, deny the
115. Scherer, supra note 30, at 154; see also S. BROWNMILLER, supra note
33, at 372 (in New York in 1971 there were 2,415 founded rape complaints but
only 1,085 arrests, leading to only 18 convictions); Berger, supra note 28, at 29
("[AIll the evidence points to a finding that many justified accusations never
receive a fair hearing."); Russell, The Prevalence and Incidence of Forcible
Rape and Attempted Rape of Females, 7 VICTIMOLOGY 81, 88 (1982) ("Rape is
the only crime for which the process referred to as 'unfounding' is utilized.");
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 97 (1967) (approximately
27% of actual rapes are reported); Barrett, Date Rape: A Campus Epidemic?,
Ms., Sept. 1982, at 48. Estimates of the number of unreported rapes and of the
incidence of rape vary. A recent study based on a survey of San Francisco wo-
men found that 41% of the 930 women respondents reported at least one com-
pleted or attempted (nonmarital) rape; only 8% of these incidents were
reported to the police. Russell, supra, at 81.
116. Berger, supra note 28, at 24 (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA.
TION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 10 (1974)).
117. See supra note 115; see also H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 95
(noting that "rape has the highest rate of acquittal or dismissal and lowest rate
of conviction for the offense charged") (emphasis in original); Ross, supra note
28, at 715 (observing that the high rate of acquittals has remained nearly con-
stant despite recent legislative and judicial reform of rape law).
One court responded to the claim that rape is easy to allege by stating:
"An equally cogent argument to the contrary can be made-that in cases in-
volving adults it is ordinarily difficult to prove that a sex act was the culmina-
tion of force exerted by the male rather than the mutual act of the
participants." State v. Walgraeve, 243 Or. 328, 330, 412 P.2d 23, 24 (1966); see
supra text accompanying notes 49-67. The victim may even be subject to live
television filming and broadcast of the trial. For example, the New Bedford
gang-rape trial was broadcast on a national cable news station (CNN). Though
the alleged victim's face was not shown, her voice was broadcast as she testi-
fied to the details of her alleged rape on the pool table in Big Dan's bar, and
some area cable channels broadcast the victim's name. See Henry, When News
Becomes Voyeurism, TIME, Mar. 26, 1984, at 64.
[Vol. 69:395
RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME
incident, blame or disbelieve the victim, or even abandon the
victim out of ignorance, anger, fear, or hurt.118 Indeed, victims
often accept these reactions as valid and blame themselves for
the incident, thinking they exercised poor judgment or were
careless.119 The old claim that rape is easily charged, therefore,
ignores the meaning and consequences of rape to the victim and
to the people around her.120
118. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 28, at 23; Burt & Estep, Wo Is a Victim?
Definitional Problems in Social Victimization, 6 VIcTIMOLOGY 15, 21-22 (1982)
(describing the victim's burden of overcoming disbelief to prove her victimiza-
tion); Griffin, Rape, The All American Crime, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRmIE,
THE VICTIM AND THE OFFENDER 51 (D. Chappel ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
FORCIBLE RAPE] (describing the myth that women want to be raped); Norman
& Nadelson, The Rape Victim Psychodynamic Considerations, in THE RAPE
ViCTIm 135 (D. Nass ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as THE RAPE VICTMI] (describ-
ing the negative reactions of male support figures after a rape).
119. See, e.g., C. DEAN & M. DEBRUYN-KOPS, supra note 38, at 106; J. WIL-
LL.ms & K. HoLMEs, supra note 33, at 81; Becker, Skinner, Abel, Howell &
Bruce, The Effects of Sexual Assault on Rape and Attempted Rape Victims, 7
VICTiMOLOGY 106, 111 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Effects of Sexual Assault];
Notman & Nadelson, supra note 118, at 133-34.
120. Those who view Hale's warning as warranted and necessary support
their view by noting the high incidence of false accusations as shown by the
high police "unfounding" rate for complaints. Compare Berger, supra note 28,
at 23-24 (victims who do not fit police stereotypes of true victims find their
claims unfounded) with J. MACDONALD, supra note 107, at 202 ('The fre-
quency of unfounded claims of rape provides a serious problem for law en-
forcement agencies.").
A major problem in analyzing the incidence of false reports rests with the
meaning of the term "unfounded" in police parlance. One study of rape com-
plaints received by the Philadelphia Police Department found that the police
officer's decision that a complaint was "unfounded" hinged on numerous fac-
tors, such as the promptness of the complaint, the physical condition of the
victim, her refusal to submit to medical attention, her behavior during the
hours before the attack (e.g., drinking), her actions during the offense (e.g.,
outcry, resistance), the location of the offense, and the participants' ages and
races. The complaint was more likely to be deemed "unfounded" when the
victim refused medical attention, when the offense occurred indoors, when the
victim knew the defendant, and when both participants were black. Cf. Com-
ment, supra note 95, at 282-309 (presenting and discussing results of study).
See also C. HURSCH, supra note 27, at 83 (noting that in Denver the police
use "unfounded" as a catch-all category for cases when no further police action
is possible, not for when the reported event did not actually occur); Russell,
supra note 115, at 89 (noting wide year-to-year variations in unfounding statis-
tics).
The analyses of the "unfounding" of a charge of rape demonstrate that
law enforcement personnel, like the rest of society, operate on assumptions
about victim and offender behavior. See, e.g., C. HURSCH, supra note 27, at 118-
22 (police '%lame" victims for placing themselves in situations in which they
are vulnerable); Berger, supra note 28, at 24; supra text accompanying notes
49-67 (police have a preconceived notion of what a victim's postassault behav-
ior "should" be). Many of these assumptions, however, are suspect or wrong.
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II. RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME: THE THEORY AND
ITS USE IN EXPERT TESTIMONY
The following section describes RTS research in detail and
discusses the evidentiary standard for admissibility of other ex-
pert testimony and novel theories. It then examines the use of
RTS theory in criminal trials and explains why testimony
about RTS is reliable and can help the jury without prejudicing
it.
A. RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME
The term "rape trauma syndrome"121 comes from a study
of rape victims conducted by Ann Wolbert Burgess and Lynda
Lytle Holmstrom.122 From July 20, 1972, to July 19, 1973, 146
people entered the emergency room of Boston City Hospital al-
leging they had been raped. The researchers divided the 146 al-
leged victims into three groups based on the researchers'
assessments of whether the victims had consented to the inter-
course. The first group consisted of ninety-two adults and in-
cluded victims who Burgess and Holmstrom say "clearly did
not consent," although the researchers give no explanation for
this conclusion. The second group consisted of victims who
lacked the cognitive or personality development to make a
judgment of consent, such as children or adolescents. The third
group consisted of individuals who had initially consented but
then experienced some stress that upset them, such as the man
demanding perversion or using violence, people in authority
finding the couple, or anxious parents bringing the child to the
hospital for examination.123
For example, they assume a true victim will report a rape immediately (and
will be hysterical). Studies show, however, that many victims do not report
their rapes and that the external reactions of rape victims vary greatly, with
some appearing impassive and controlled. See supra text accompanying note
115; infra text accompanying notes 128-30; cf. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 33,
at 387 (noting that when New York City instituted a special sex crimes analy-
sis squad and had policewomen interview complainants, the number of charges
classified as "false" dropped dramatically to a figure that corresponded exactly
to the rate of false reports for other violent crimes).
121. A "syndrome" is a "[g]roup of symptoms; an assembly of signs and
symptoms which indicate [a] recognizable condition." A "trauma" is a "physi-
cal injury caused by a blow, or fall, or a psychologically damaging emotional
experience." A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 112 (2d ed. 1978).
122. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCIIIA-
TRY 981 (1974).
123. Holmstrom & Burgess, Assessing Trauma in the Rape Victim, in THE
RAPE VIcTIM, supra note 118, at 112, 115.
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Defining rape as "forced, violent sexual penetration against
the victim's will and without the victim's consent,"124 the re-
searchers based their study only on the first group, women who
allegedly had suffered forcible rapes in which there was no
question of consent. These ninety-two women included blacks
and whites in approximately equal numbers and a much
smaller number of women of other races and ethnicity (Orien-
tal, Indian, Spanish-speaking). Their work statuses varied; the
victims included college students, career women, housewives,
and women on welfare. They ranged in age from seventeen to
seventy-three years. They included women who were single,
married, divorced, separated, widowed, and cohabitating with a
man. Their attractiveness ranged from "very pretty" to "very
plain" and they dressed in a variety of ways-from "high fash-
ion" to "hippie." Some had children; some did not. Some vic-
tims were pregnant, including one woman who was in her
eighth month.' 25
The researchers interviewed all of the women within thirty
minutes of a call from the hospital. They followed up the ini-
tial interviews with phone counseling or home visits. 25 Based
on these interviews and later consultations with the victims,
Burgess and Holmstrom concluded that rape victims evidence a
two-phase group of symptoms, which the researchers called
"rape trauma syndrome," as a result of being raped.1v Phase I
of RTS is the "acute phase," which occurs immediately after
the attack and is marked by a disorganization of the victim's
life style. The most prominent symptom in this stage is ex-
treme fear.2s The victims also may demonstrate a wide range
of emotions in one of two "styles," expressed or controlled. A
victim with an expressed style would express her feelings of
fear, anger, and anxiety by crying, sobbing, smiling, or acting
restless or tense. A victim with a controlled style would hide
her feelings and appear calm. About equal numbers of victims
124. Id. at 111.
125. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, in THE RAPE VICTIa.
supra note 118, at 119-21.
126. 1d at 121.
127. Rape trauma syndrome is "the acute phase and long-term reorganiza-
tion process that occurs as a result of forcible rape or attempted forcible rape."
Id
128. During the first several weeks after the rape, the emotional reactions
of the victims covered a "wide gamut of feelings" as the victims began to deal
with the rape. They ranged from fear, humiliation, and embarrassment to an-
ger, revenge, and self-blame. Some victims also expressed fear of physical vio-
lence and death. Id. at 123.
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fell into each style of emotion.12 9
The acute phase also may include physical effects from the
attack, such as soreness and bruising, skeletal muscle tension,
headaches, and fatigue.130 Some women complained of gastro-
intestinal irritability such as stomach pains, loss of appetite or
nausea, and genitourinary disturbances such as vaginal dis-
charge, itching, burning with urination, and generalized pain in
the genital area.131 Some victims also experienced sleeping dis-
orders related to the time of the attack. If, for example, the
victim was awakened by the assailant, she might awaken at
that same time each night. Other victims cried or screamed in
their sleep. Some became edgy or jumpy over minor
incidents.132
Phase II of RTS is the long-term reorganization process
victims undergo after the rape.133 Although not all victims ex-
perienced the same symptoms in the same sequence during this
period, the majority continued to experience moderate to mild
symptoms ranging from phobic reactions to discomfort.134
Some victims changed residences, many changed phone num-
bers, many had nightmares, and almost eighty percent turned
to family or close friends for support. Many of the women de-
veloped "traumatophobias"-defensive reactions to the circum-
stances of the rape. Those who were attacked while alone
reported fear of being alone and those who were attacked while
sleeping in bed reported fear of being indoors. Others devel-
oped fear of crowds, fear of people walking behind them, or
fear of the outdoors, depending on the circumstances of their
assaults.135 Many of the victims reported having sexual fears
after the rape. Some victims reported disruptions in relation-
ships and those who had been sexually active before the inci-
dent also reported crises in their sex lives.136
129. Id. at 122.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 123.
132. Id. at 122.
133. In a follow-up study published by Burgess and Holmstrom in 1979,
they reported that four to six years after a sexual assault, 26% of the 81 vic-
tims responding stated that they had not yet recovered from or adjusted to
their assault. A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: CRISIS & RECOVERY 407-48
(1979); see infra note 165.
134. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, in THE RAPE VICTIM,
supra note 118, at 123-24 & table 2.
135. Id. at 124-27.
136. One woman is quoted as stating five months after the assault, "There
are times I get hysterical with my boyfriend. I don't want him near me; I get
panicked. Sex is OK, but I still feel like screaming." Id. at 127.
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A special problem arose in victims who had been raped
before in their lives. The researchers found that while the vic-
tim was discussing the later rape, she "spontaneously would
switch back and forth between the present rape and the past
one. The current crisis reactivated the older one."137
Numerous other writers who have joined the research on
the effect of rape on victims 38 tend to corroborate Burgess and
Holmstrom's theory of RTS as a two-phase reaction to rape. 39
These later studies describe Phase I of RTS as beginning imme-
diately after an attack, when the victim experiences feelings of
shock, fear, humiliation, vulnerability, powerlessness, anxiety,
and disgust. The victim moves into Phase II when she attempts
to reorganize her life, but she may continue to experience fear,
nightmares about the assault, depression, avoidance responses
137. Holmstrom & Burgess, Assessing Trauma in the Rape Victim, in THE
RAPE VIcrm, supra note 118, at 112, 115. Burgess and Holmstrom describe
two variations on RTS: "compounded reaction" and "silent reaction." "Com-
pounded reaction" occurs when the victim experiences RTS symptoms and re-
activates symptoms of previous conditions, such as physical or psychiatric
illness or drug dependency. Id. at 111. "Silent reaction" occurs when a victim
experiences the symptoms of rape but never reveals that she has been raped.
Id. at 111-12. The finding that preexisting life stresses can compound rape
trauma finds support in recent research by Ruch and Hennessy, who conclude
that a victim with preexisting stress may be more vulnerable to the trauma of
a sexual assault than a victim who is not experiencing serious life-change
stresses. Ruch & Hennessy, Sexual Assault: Victim and Attack Dimension. 7
VICTIMoLOGY 94, 102 (1982). Seventeen percent of the victims in their study
were victims of earlier assaults. Id. at 103.
138. Indeed, the study of rape and of victims in general has expanded phe-
nomenally since the early 1970's. Entire periodicals and books now are de-
voted to victimology and a comprehensive bibliography on rape would flu a
small volume. See Pawloski, Forcible Rape: An Updated Bibliography, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRMINOLOGY 601 (1983).
139. A sampling of writings on rape victims that support the RTS descrip-
tion of victim reaction to rape includes: J. BARKAS, supra note 38, at 121-22; C.
DEAN & M. DEBRUYN-KoPs, supra note 38, at 110-13 (1982); E. HILBEiAN,
THE RAPE VIcTIM 33-39 (1976); S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE
RAPE VICrim: A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 215-31 (1979); Becker,
Abel & Skinner, The Impact of a Sexual Assault on the Victim's Sexual Lif, 4
VICTIMOLOGY 229 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Impact of a Sexual Assault];
Effects of Sexual Assaul supra note 119; Griffim, Rape, The All American
Crime, in FoRcmLE RAPE, supra note 118; Notman & Nadelson, The Rape Vic-
tim: Pyschodynamic Considerations, in THE RAPE VICTIM, supra note 118, at
130; Ruch & Hennessy, supra note 137; Ruch & Leon, Type of Sexual Assault
Trauma: A Multidimensional Analysis of a Short.term Panel, 8 VICr IOLOGY
237 (1983).
Rape now appears in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association as one stressor that can produce the syndrome
posttraumatic stress disorder. AMRICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOS.
TIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 236 (3d ed. 1980).
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to people and situations that take the form of phobias, changes
in lifestyle, anxiety, and sexual and interpersonal
dysfunctions.140
Some writers have refined the two-phase theory. Suther-
land and Scherl,141 for example, add an interim phase called
the "outward adjustment" phase between Phases I and 11.142 In
this interim phase the rape victim denies, suppresses, and ratio-
nalizes the event. She resumes normal activities and appears to
adjust to the assault. The adjustment, however, is a
"pseudoadjustment" that is followed by later depression, often
precipitated by a specific event such as a court summons, sight-
ing of a man who resembles the rapist, or the discovery that
she is pregnant. 43
Notman and Nadelson also add details to the description of
victims' emotional reactions to rape.144 They characterize rape
as a crisis situation that increases feelings of helplessness; in-
tensifies conflicts about dependence and independence; gener-
ates self-criticism and guilt that devalue the victim and may
interfere with trusting relationships, especially with men; cre-
ates difficulty in handling anger and aggression; and produces
persistent feelings of vulnerability.145 They also conclude that,
although the identified posttrauma phases apply to any post-
trauma stress, rape trauma syndrome includes the distinctive
symptoms of sexual dysfunction and decreased trust in men.','(
Notman and Nadelson offer an important qualification of
140. See, e.g., Ruch & Hennessy, supra note 137; Effects of Sexual Assault,
supra note 119.
141. Sutherland & Scherl, Patterns of Response Among Victims of Rape, 40
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 503 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Patterns of
Response].
142. Id. at 507.
143. Sutherland & Scherl, Crisis Intervention with Victims of Rape, in
THE RAPE VICTIM, supra note 118, at 335-36.
Sutherland and Scherl based these observations on the experiences of 13
rape victims they studied in 1966 and 1967. The victims were white women
aged from 18 to 24 and were seen in a setting similar to a community mental
health facility within 48 hours of the attack. Patterns of Response, supra note
141, at 504. Other researchers cite the Sutherland and Scherl modification of
the RTS theory, in apparent approval of the theory. See, e.g., C. DEAN & M.
DEBRUYN-KOPs, supra note 38, at 110-13.
144. Notman & Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Considera-
tions, in THE RAPE VICTIM, supra note 118, at 131.
145. Id. at 130.
146. Id. at 137-38; see also Bristow, supra note 1. Becker, Abel, and Skin-
ner reported in a 1979 survey of clinical research on rape that 61% of rape vic-
tims showed a decreased interest in sex or discontinued all sexual activity.
The Impact of a Sexual Assault, supra note 139, at 231.
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their results: "Each rape victim responds to and integrates the
experience differently depending on her age, life situation, the
circumstances of the rape, her specific personality style, and
the responses of those from whom she seeks support."47 Other
researchers likewise observe that not every victim responds the
same because complex variables may affect a victim's reaction
to her assault.148
One such variable is the relationship between the victim
and her assailant. Studies suggest that rape by a stranger is less
emotionally devastating than rape by an acquaintance in one's
own home.49 A second variable that can change the impact of
rape is the use of physical force. A woman who is beaten sense-
less may suffer less emotional trauma from a rape than one
who submits to the rape under threat of her life.150 A possible
explanation for these results is that a victim who can deperson-
alize the offender and herself will deny the event.1 51 A second
possible explanation is that the victim is less likely to blame
herself for a brutal attack by a stranger than for an assault by
an acquaintance in which she escapes extrinsic physical in-
jury. 52 Although these researchers acknowledge the differ-
147. Notman & Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Considera-
tions, in THE RAPE VICTIM, supra note 118, at 130.
148. See, ag., J. WILLIAMs & Y. HOLMES, supra note 33, at 21, 87, 110; EF-
fects of Sexual Assault, supra note 119, at 107; Ruch & Hennessy, supra note
137, at 94. Reactions among victims may be affected by numerous variables in-
cluding, but not limited to, the victim's age, ethnicity, attitude toward sexual-
ity, and acquaintance with her assailant, the brutality of the attack, and the
place of the attack. J. WILLAMs & K. HoLMES, supra note 33. These variables
may explain the range of reactions to rape within the RTS construct; they do
not, however, contradict the syndrome theory of reactions to rape. Many
other diagnostic categories of psychological dysfunction, such as depression,
are characterized by common symptoms that may be experienced in varying
degrees by people suffering from the disorder. Likewise, one virus can cause
different reactions in different individuals, all of which would be diagnosed in
the same manner. For example, a strain of influenza could produce a range of
symptoms in the people exposed to the virus, all of whom accurately would be
described as 'having the flu."
The usefulness and validity of the RTS theory thus are not destroyed by
the fact that all victims do not experience precisely the same symptoms in the
same order. Proponents of the theory, including Burgess and Holmstrom,
make no claim of uniform reactions. See Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note
125, at 123-24.
149. See, e.g., Weis & Borges, Victomology and Rape: The Case of the Legit.
imate Victim, in THE RAPE VICTIM, supra note 118, at 35, 60.
150. 1& at 61.
151. Id. at 60-61.
152. See C. DEAN & M DEBRUYN-KoPs, supra note 38, at 106. Other stud-
ies suggest that a victim who assumes some responsibility for her victimization
may cope more effectively because self-blame may reduce the victim's sense of
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ences in the degree of impact experienced by rape victims and
the range of variables that may explain those differences, they
support the two-phase RTS theory of Burgess and Holmstrom.
A recent work by Williams and Holmes challenges the
methodology of the Burgess and Holmstrom studies and their
underlying assumption that rape is a crisis.153 The authors ex-
amine the empirical studies of rape victims' experiences and
conclude that the work "lack[s] methodological sophistica-
tion."154 They observe:
For obvious reasons, there has been and should be a hesitancy to im-
pose empirical designs and measures on personal tragedy. It is not
surprising, then, that much of what is known about the rape experi-
ence is subjective, based on a limited number of case studies and char-
acterized by a great many unsupported assumptions, one of which is
that rape constitutes or precipitates a crisis.1 5 5
They criticize several of the leading studies, including the work
of Burgess and Holmstrom and that of Sutherland and
Scherl,156 for not systematically documenting the "intrinsic
meaning" of rape-how the victim perceives it. They further
conclude that no data offer a reasonable explanation of why the
extrinsic meaning of rape-how the public sees the rape vic-
tim--differs from that of other public attitudes towards other
ictis.157
Williams and Holmes conducted their own cross-cultural
study158 to examine both victim responses to rape and public at-
titudes about rape. The victim study was based on interviews
with sixty-one rape victims who were seen in crisis centers in
two Texas cities and who agreed to be interviewed.159 The pub-
lic attitude study was based on the reactions of members of dif-
ferent ethnic groups to nine scenarios, including their
definition of a specific set of facts as rape, their attribution of
fault to the victim, and their willingness to prosecute the al-
leged assailant.60 Significantly, the Williams and Holmes study
did not contradict the basic description of rape trauma syn-
drome; indeed, the results corroborated the Burgess and Holm-
vulnerability and of an irrational world. See Brody, Self-Blame Held to Be Im-
portant in Victims' Recovery, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1984, at C1, col. 1.
153. J. WILLIAMS & K. HOLMES, supra note 33, at 15-16.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Id.
156. Id at 14-17.
157. Id. at 17.
158. The victims were Anglo, Black, and Mexican-American. Id. at 52.
159. Id. at 56-57.
160. 1d. at 60-62.
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strom RTS model. The victims experienced negative feelings
towards men, intense fear, and feelings of helplessness. Many
victims changed residences and phone numbers after the as-
sault. All the victims in the study evidenced some change in
general functioning and a tendency to withdraw from routine
activities. Many victims reported health concerns of varying
degrees, including tension (eighty-two percent), panicky feel-
ings (sixty percent), sleep disturbances (fifty-eight percent),
nightmares (fifty-eight percent), headaches (forty percent),
poor appetite (thirty-three percent), fatigue (twenty-seven per-
cent), suicidal thoughts (twenty-seven percent), stomach
problems (twenty-four percent), and dizziness (nine percent).161
Of the factors considered, only the race and ethnicity of the
victims affected the degree of impact on the victim.162 The re-
searchers concluded that people who treat rape victims, such as
crisis intervention personnel, may operate on assumptions
about victims that are based on studies of Anglo victims. They
may thus mishandle victims of different races and ethnic back-
grounds, believing that an overtly calm victim was not raped or
that a hysterical one is psychologically disturbed.63 Williams
and Holmes also concluded that victims' reactions to rape are
not short-lived;164 victims may never fully recover and may
function indefinitely at a "lower than pre-crisis level."165
These findings corroborate the RTS theory and show that
the victim's psychological trauma is affected by the attitudes of
people around her.166 Although the majority of the respon-
dents in the Williams and Holmes study were victims of "stere-
otypic assaults"-that is, by a stranger, without warning, where
161. Id. at 95, 100, 104 & table 10. "Other symptoms," reported by 11% of
the victims, included epileptic seizures exacerbated by the assault, manic be-
havior, chain-smoking, back problems, seizures from concussion, and frigidity.
Id-
162. Id at 106-07.
163. Id- at 111.
164. I& at 109-10.
165. d. at 109. Burgess and Holmstrom in their later work observed that
rape victims still suffered effects of the rape years after the attack. See supra
note 133. Research on the long-range effects of rape is limited because the in-
terest in rape victims is a fairly recent phenomenon. This research has begun,
however, and reports of long-range studies have begun to appear in the jour-
nals. See, e.g., Effects of Seual Assault supra note 119, at 107.
166. J. WLLIAis & K. HouuEs, supra note 33, at 21. They describe rape as
"an individual experience which is compounded by the reactions of significant
and generalized others who respond to the victim. Rape is thus conceptualized
as comprised of interwoven intrinsic (personal) and extrinsic (public) dimen-
sions." Id.
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the stranger threatened the victim and the victim suffered ob-
servable injury167-more recent studies indicate that the psy-
chological cost of sexual assault is not confined to such
stereotypic, completed rapes. In addition, victims of attempted
rape experience short-term and long-range symptoms similar to
those of victims of completed rape.16s These common reaction
patterns again conform to the Burgess and Holmstrom two-
phase model.169
B. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND NOVEL THEORIES: THE
STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY
The admissibility of expert testimony hinges on fairly sim-
ple federal and state rules of evidence that afford the trial
judge broad discretion. Although courts and legislatures invoke
numerous phrases to describe the standard of admissibility, all
jurisdictions essentially require that the expert testimony be
helpful to the trier of fact.170 To determine what is helpful, a
167. Id. at 56-57, 80-81.
168. Effects of Sexual Assault, supra note 119, at 112.
169. Id. at 107.
170. This is the standard set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
has served as a model for many state evidence codes. Rule 702 states that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 702. See, e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 711 F.2d 595, 599 (5th
Cir. 1983) (expert testimony must assist, not confuse, jury), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 705 (1984); United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 369 (2d Cir.) (topic un-
likely to be within the knowledge of the average layman appropriate for ex-
pert testimony), cert. denied sub nom. Mont v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2456
(1983); United States v. Jackson, 688 F.2d 1121 (7th Cir. 1982) (helpfulness, not
necessity, is the standard), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1043 (1983).
This discussion assumes that the testimony is offered by a person qualified
as an expert. Expertise under Rule 702 is satisfied by a wide range of qualifi-
cations; an educational degree or other formal training is not necessarily re-
quired. The advisory committee note to Rule 702 explains the broad phrasing
of the rule:
The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited
merely to the "scientific" and "technical" but extend to all "special-
ized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow
sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education." Thus within the scope of the rule are not only
experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physicians, physicists,
and architects, but also the large group sometimes called "skilled"
witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note. Courts have read the Rule 702
standard liberally to qualify as experts a vast array of persons with special
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court should consider whether the jury already knows about
the content of the testimony; whether the jury will be con-
fused, prejudiced, or overawed by the testimony; whether the
testimony is reliable; and whether the testimony will involve
too much court time.171 Neither federal nor state rules of evi-
dence, however, explain how a court should weigh these fac-
tors, and judges, left to their own assessments and assumptions,
use broad discretion in determining what is helpful.72
When the expert testimony involves a novel underlying sci-
entific theory or method, judicial discretion raises yet another
skills, experience, and training. See, eg., Haynes v. American Motors Corp.,
691 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1982) (engineer); United States v. Gilliss, 645 F.2d
1269, 1277-78 (8th Cir. 1981) (psychiatrist specializing in pathological gam-
bling); United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1361 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979) (layperson with substantial' experience dealing with
marijuana); United States v. Portis, 542 F.2d 414, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1976) (clinical
psychologist with Ph.D. who had only three months experience and could not
meet Illinois requirements for certification as a psychologist); Alvarado v.
Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1046, 1049 (1st Cir. 1975) (psychiatrist not board-certi-
fied); Gardner v. General Motors Corp., 507 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1974)
(mechanical and chemical engineers).
171. See generally E. CLEARY, McCORBUCK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 29-31
(1984) (discussing elements warranting use of expert testimony) [hereinafter
McCoRMICK]; FED. R. Evw. 403 (grounds for exclusion of relevant evidence).
172. See e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 711 F.2d 595, 598; United States v.
Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1084 n.14 (9th Cir. 1983); Fernandez v. Chios Shipping
Co., 542 F.2d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 1976); Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 513,
325 A-2d 277, 279-80 (1973); Grimes v. State, - Ind. -, _. 450 N.E.2d 512, 519-
20 (1983); State v. Elam, 328 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Iowa 1982); Commonwealth v.
Boyd, 367 Mass. 169, -, 326 N.E.2d 320, 328 (1975); State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d
541, 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981).
Appellate courts occasionally will fimd an abuse of discretion. See eg., In
re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 278-79 (3d
Cir. 1983) (doubts about whether an expert can help the jury should be re-
solved in favor of admissibility); Garrett v. Desa Indus., Inc., 705 F.2d 721, 724
(4th Cir. 1983) (abuse of discretion to prevent mechanical engineer from testi-
fying about negligent design of product manufactured by defendant).
As Professor Weyrauch has observed, the rules of evidence operate as
masks of the judges' deep-seated and often unconscious value choices.
Weyrauch says that when a judge has excluded evidence as irrelevant, the
judge "might as meaningfully have said, 'I do not want to hear this at all!"'
Weyrauch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 699,
710-11 (1978). Although Weyrauch does not see the legal masks as necessarily
wicked, he suggests that the masks can have negative uses when the social pol-
icies they protect or help enforce are harmful. Id. at 711-13. The exclusion of
RTS evidence supports Weyrauch's theory, because neither logic nor reason
explains the exclusion. The underlying reason may be that some judges sim-
ply "do not want to hear this evidence at all." As a result, they exclude the
evidence by invoking the legal masks of "relevance," "discretion," "reliability,"
and "prejudice."
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hurdle to admissibility. Most apply the Frye standard,173 which
requires that the underlying scientific method or theory be gen-
erally accepted by the relevant scientific community.174 The
notion is that judges should defer to a consensus of the experts
because the judges lack the expertise to evaluate the value of
novel theories and methods.175 Under the Frye standard, par-
ties can demonstrate the general acceptance of novel scientific
173. The name derives from the case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923). The defendant in Frye argued that the trial court erred in
excluding expert testimony about the results of a lie detector test to which he
had submitted. The appellate court affirmed his conviction, holding that the
lie detector test had not yet gained enough scientific recognition among physi-
ological and psychological authorities to justify the testimony. Id. at 1014.
Numerous courts apply the test outlined in Frye, though some do not cite
Frye specifically. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
148, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245-46 (1976); Cornett v. State, - Ind. -, -, 450 N.E.2d
498, 503 (1983); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 394-95, 635 P.2d 1236, 1242-43
(1981); Perry v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kessinger, 652 S.W.2d 655, 661 (Ky.
1983); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 196, 327 N.E.2d 671, 674 (1975);
People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 622, 329 N.W.2d 743, 745 (1982); State v.
White, 621 S.W.2d 287, 292 (Mo. 1981); People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17, 19, 452
N.Y.S.2d 929, 930 (1982), affd, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 466 N.Y.S. 255, 453 N.E.2d 484
(1983); Driskell v. State, 659 P.2d 343, 356 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Common-
wealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 101-02, 436 A.2d 170, 172-73 (1981); Powers v.
Carvalho, 109 R.I. 120, 125-26, 281 A.2d 298, 301 (1971); Crawley v. State, 219
Tenn. 707, 714-15, 413 S.W.2d 370, 373 (1967); State v. Mulder, 29 Wash. App.
513, 515, 629 P.2d 462, 463 (1981).
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not mention Frye, some fed-
eral courts continue to invoke the "general acceptance" test. See, e.g., United
States v. Traficant, 566 F. Supp. 1046, 1047 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Others apply a
relevance standard that considers reliability, as shown through general accept-
ance, as one component of relevance. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973). See generally Note,
Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774 (1980) (considering
the competing standards for admitting expert testimony based on novel scien-
tific techniques and concluding that the general acceptance test, although im-
perfect, is preferable to a balancing test).
174. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Absolute certainty, however, is not required. See,
e.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.) (expert testimony iden-
tifying defendant's voice by spectrographic evidence admissible despite doubts
within the scientific community about the process's absolute accuracy), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
175. See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) ("A court-
room is not a research laboratory."); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Frye assures that "a minimal reserve of experts exists
who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a partic-
ular case."). A related concern is the aura of reliability that the scientific evi-
dence may bear, despite its tentative or unproved character. Brown, 557 F.2d
at 556.
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evidence by its use in other cases;176 discussion about it in scien-
tific journals, law reviews, and other scholarly or authoritative
materials;77 the number of people writing about it;118 and other
evidence that the expert's theory or method is generally ac-
cepted. Other courts depend on a reliability test, which re-
quires only that the novel scientific evidence is reliable.179
"General acceptance" by the relevant scientific community is
not required, but it can affect the weight of the testimony. Still
other courts use a hybrid test, whereby the novel theory or
method either must be accepted by scientists or have "passed
from the stage of experimentation and uncertainty to that of
reasonable demonstrability."180 Trial judges reserve broad dis-
cretion under each of these standards, and one commentator
has argued that judges exercise that discretion arbitrarily:
Instead of using [the Frye standard] as an analytical tool to decide
whether novel scientific evidence should be admitted, it appears that
many courts apply it as a label to justify their own views about the
176. See ag., United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 529 (5th Cir. 1981);
Brown, 557 F.2d at 557; Ballet, 519 F.2d at 465-66; United States v. MacDonald,
485 F. Supp. 1087, 1095 (E.D.N.C. 1979); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 502
(Me. 1978); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 569-71, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911-12
(1978); Commonwealth v. Jones, 459 Pa. 62, 68-69, 327 A.2d 10, 14 (1974).
177. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 392, 292 A.2d 286, 291 (1972);
Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence. Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1217 (1980); see, e.g.,
Brown, 557 F.2d at 557; MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. at 1095; People v. Palmer, 80
Cal. App. 3d 239, 254, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (1978).
178. See United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 1970).
179. McCormick advocated this approach to novel scientific evidence. Mc-
COPICK, supra note 171, § 203 at 491; see also, eg., Baller, 519 F.2d at 466;
State v. Mitchell, 169 Conn. 161, 169, 362 A.2d 808, 812 (1975); Dyas v. United
States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); People v. Mi-
lone, 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 394, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1358 (1976); State v. Hall, 297
N.W.2d 80, 84-85 (Iowa 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981); State v. Cat-
anese, 368 So. 2d 975, 980-81 (La. 1979); Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co., -
Mont. -, _ 657 P.2d 594, 598 (1983); State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 112, 273
S.E.2d 273, 280 (1981); State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 57, 446 N.E.2d 444,
448 (1983); State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 466-67, 623 P.2d 1095, 1099-1101
(1981), affd, 292 Or. 350, 638 P.2d 1145 (1982). But see State v. Brown, 297 Or.
404, -, 687 P.2d 751, - (1984) (noting that elements of Kersting's "reasonably
reliable" test for evidence admissibility are filtered through several factors of a
"relevancy" test).
180. Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); see also
Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 85-90 (FIa. 1983) (using what it called the "rele-
vancy approach" in holding that hypnotically induced recall testimony was
properly admitted); cf Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395
(1982) (rejecting the Frye general acceptance requirement and stating that
trial judges should weigh the evidence in each case to decide if the procedure
is at the "scientific stage of verifiable certainty" rather than calculate a
consensus).
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reliability of particular forensic techniques.'Bl
The reaction of judges to RTS evidence, as shown in the
next section, supports this criticism. The reported decisions on
RTS evidence tend merely to describe the evidence, cursorily
define rape trauma syndrome, present a rote incantation of the
legal tests for admissibility, and conclude that the evidence does
or does not help, is or is not generally accepted, is or is not reli-
able, and will or will not prejudice the jury. 8 2 Some courts ex-
cluding the evidence also add that the evidence will "invade the
province of the jury."18 3 None of the decisions analyzes the re-
search on which the theory is based; none examines in any
depth the underlying theory or its acceptance in the relevant
field of experts; and none articulates a persuasive rationale for
admission or exclusion of the evidence. Also missing from
these cases is a persuasive factual basis for the determinations
of helpfulness, prejudice, reliability, or general acceptance.
C. THE RTS DECISIONS
Offers of expert testimony about RTS has surfaced in
many civill84 and criminal8s5 cases, but only four of the crimi-
181. Gianelli, supra note 177, at 1221. The primary purpose of this Article
is not to fashion a new standard of admissibility for all novel scientific testi-
mony but to show that RTS evidence satisfies the prevailing standards.
182. See cases cited infra notes 184-85. The California Supreme Court
opinion in People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1984), is, to some extent, an exception. The opinion contains a sophisticated
description of the rape trauma syndrome theory that likely was supplied by
the respondent or the amicus California Women Lawyers. Unfortunately, the
justices were unable to relate that description of the RTS research to the legal
constructs in a logically persuasive manner. See infira text accompanying
notes 233-38.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 194-96.
184. See, e.g., Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F. Supp. 1111, 1122 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(allowing expert medical testimony on psychological disturbances flowing
from the homosexual rape of an inmate-offered to prove damages in civil
rights action against prison officials); Division of Corrections v. Wynn, 438 So.
2d 446, 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (RTS evidence offered on issue of dam-
ages); Alphonso v. Charity Hosp., 413 So. 2d 982, 986-87 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
(RTS evidence offered to prove mental patient suffered from trauma distinct
from symptoms of schizophrenia and thus was entitled to damages); Terrio v.
McDonough, 16 Mass. App. 163, -, 450 N.E.2d 190, 198 (1983) (allowing testi-
mony of Burgess on RTS to the effect that medical science recognizes RTS and
that victim's conduct was consistent therewith-offered to prove act was rape,
not consensual); White v. Violent Crimes Compensation Board, 76 N.J. 368,
388, 388 A.2d 206, 216 (1978) (mentioning RTS in case involving a victim's at-
tempt to recover money from the V.C.C.B. after the statute of limitations had
elapsed); Skaria v. State, 110 Misc. 2d 711, 715-16, 442 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841-42
(N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981) (RTS testimony of treating clinical psychologist offered to
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nal cases have reached the state supreme court level. The
Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that RTS evidence is ad-
missible when offered to prove nonconsent to intercourse,18S
and the supreme courts of California, Minnesota, and Missouri
concluded that it is inadmissible.187
prove damages in personal injury suit against state for rape in state-owned res-
idential unit); Wesley v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 680, 687-88, 268
S.E.2d 855, 861 (1980) (expert testimony on RTS offered to prove sexual as-
sault had permanent psychological effects).
185. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, -, 681 P.2d 291, 293-302, 203
Cal. Rptr. 450, 452-61 (1984) (rejecting testimony of rape counselor that victim
suffered from RTS on issue of whether a forcible rape occurred); State v.
Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654-55, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (1982) (allowing RTS evi-
dence offered on issue of consent); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 240
(Minn. 1982) (en banc) (rejecting RTS evidence offered on the issue of
whether complainant was a victim of rape and had not fabricated her allega-
tions); State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982) (en banc) (same);
State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (rejecting RTS evi-
dence offered on the issue of whether the intercourse was consensual); State v.
Jackson, 97 N.M. 467, 468, 641 P.2d 498, 499, 500 (1982) (allowing psychologist
who had examined victim to testify that victim's case was "one of the worst
cases of rape trauma syndrome he had ever seen" when defense had volunta-
rily revealed to prosecution results of the psychiatric exam ordered at defend-
ant's request); State v. Whitman, No. 9-181 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 27, 1984)
(approving admission of psychiatric testimony on RTS in case involving 12-
year-old victim offered to corroborate her testimony that she was raped); cf.
State v. Thomas, 130 Ariz. 432, 434, 636 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1981) (en banc) (trial
judge properly admitted testimony of witnesses acquainted with victim that
she evidenced a marked change in personality after the incident; testimony
relevant and not an improper attempt to bolster victim's credibility); People v.
Mathews, 91 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 1022, 1025, 154 Cal. Rptr. 628, 630, 632 (1979)
(victim of gang rape claimed RTS as part of defense of diminished capacity or
self-defense to charge of murder of man with rapist; claimed RTS created fear
for her life).
Closely related to these decisions are cases that involve expert psychologi-
cal testimony on typical reactions of child sex-abuse victims offered to prove
that abuse occurred or to explain seemingly curious behavior of the victims.
See e.g., State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 610, 645 P.2d 1330, 1339 (1982) (allowing a
child psychiatrist and pediatrician to testify regarding credibility of child vic-
tim of incest by stepfather); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, _ 657 P.2d 1215,
1221 (1983) (allowing testimony by social worker that child incest victim's be-
havior was typical of children sexually abused by a family member); State v.
Harwood, 45 Or. App. 931, 940, 609 P.2d 1312, 1317 (1980) (same); Common-
wealth v. Stago, 267 Pa. Super. 90, 406 A.2d 533, 535 (1979) (rejecting argument
that court erred in allowing treating psychologist to testify that incest victims
often felt depressed, angry, and guilty and needed psychiatric care and hospi-
talization); see also infra note 205.
186. Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299.
187. Bledsoe 36 Cal. 3d at-, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; Saldana,
324 N.W.2d at 230; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240.
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1. Arguments Against RTS
Using the admissibility standard of "helpfulness to the
jury," the Missouri and Minnesota courts concluded that expert
testimony on RTS is not admissible in a consent-rape trial be-
cause it does not help the jury.188 The courts did not view RTS
as a test that can accurately determine if a rape occurred89 be-
cause RTS might result from any psychologically traumatic
event.190 Thus, an expert on RTS cannot testify that a victim's
symptoms were caused by a particular incident but only that
the victim possesses characteristics consistent with a traumatic
stress reaction to an event such as rape. Such limited testi-
mony, some courts believe, is irrelevant.191
The Minnesota and Missouri courts offered a second argu-
ment against RTS evidence that the California court found es-
pecially persuasive: because mental health professionals use
RTS theory as a therapeutic tool in counseling victims, and not
as a fact-finding tool, it is unhelpful when offered to prove that
a rape occurred.192 The California court, in adopting this argu-
ment, stressed the nonjudgmental nature of therapy and that
rape counselors "do not probe inconsistencies in their clients'
descriptions of the facts of the incident."193
Given these alleged limitations of RTS, the only purpose
the Minnesota and Missouri courts perceive for introduction of
expert testimony on RTS in a consent-rape case is to bolster
the victim's credibility.194 Most jurisdictions allow expert testi-
mony on witness credibility only in unusual circumstances such
as sexual assault cases involving child victims or mentally re-
tarded victims.195 The reason courts give for this limitation is
that credibility determinations are the province of the jury, not
the province of experts. 96
All three courts viewed RTS evidence as prejudicial. They
variously speculated that expert testimony on RTS would have
188. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240.
189. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229-30; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240.
190. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240.
191. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240.
192. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 238; see ilkfra text
accompanying notes 233-37.
193. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
194. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241.
195. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231.
196. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; Saldana,
324 N.W.2d at 231; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241.
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an aura of special reliability and certainty;197 that it would di-
vert the jury's attention away from the real issue and cause
confusion with numerous collateral issues;198 and that it could
trigger a "battle of experts."199
For these reasons, concluded the Missouri court, expert
testimony that a victim suffers from RTS and that she has been
raped is "not sufficiently based on a scientific technique, which
is either parochially accepted or rationally sound, to overcome
the inherent danger of prejudice created by [the witness's] sta-
tus as an expert."200 RTS evidence has not, added the Minne-
sota court, "reached a level of reliability that surpasses the
quality of common sense evaluation present in jury delibera-
tions."201 Finally, according to the California court, although
RTS may be generally recognized by the relevant scientific
community, "it is not relied on in that community for the pur-
pose for which the prosecution sought to use it in this case,
namely, to prove that a rape in fact occurred."202
2. Responding to the Arguments Against RTS
California, Minnesota, and Missouri rejected the use of ex-
pert testimony about the presence of RTS in a victim as evi-
dence of nonconsent because they believe such testimony is not
"helpful" and would unduly prejudice the jury in favor of the
victim. These conclusions are surprising, given the general
trend toward relaxation of admissibility standards for expert
testimony.203 The arguments these courts offer to support their
conclusions are unconvincing and seem to be based on mistaken
assumptions about the underlying psychological theory, about
jurors, and about victims.
a. The Relevancy of RTS
The argument that RTS is irrelevant because a psycholo-
gist cannot properly say that a particular incident caused the
symptoms misses the point. The Federal Rules define rele-
vancy as having a tendency to make a fact more probable than
197. Bledsoe 36 Cal. 3d at-, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; Saldana,
324 N.W.2d at 230; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241.
198. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241.
199. Sadana, 324 N.W.2d at 230; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241.
200. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240.
201. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
202. Bledsoe 36 Cal. 3d at -, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
203. See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977).
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it would have been without the evidence.204 That definition
makes psychological "bruises" as relevant as physical bruises in
a consent-rape trial. Both certainly may result from many
causes. Neither the physician who testifies that a woman has
physical bruises nor a psychologist who testifies that a woman
suffers from RTS can state unequivocally that the condition
was caused by a specific incident of nonconsensual inter-
course,205 yet the evidence of a victim's physical injuries is
204. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency'to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.").
In a case applying the rule, the Fifth Circuit considered an offer of expert
testimony that a man accused of willfully shooting at a passing helicopter
lacked the "propensity to commit a violent act." United States v. Webb, 625
F.2d 709, 710 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Brief for Appellant at 24). The court
found the offered testimony relevant, explaining:
The excluded testimony would have purported to show, based on psy-
chological tests, that [the defendant] was non-violent and therefore
unlikely to shoot at a helicopter. If competent, that evidence clearly
would have some tendency to confirm [his] alibi, i.e., a peaceable man
would more likely be planting turnips than shooting at passing
aircraft.
Id. at 711. The court nevertheless concluded that the evidence was properly
excluded because the subject was within the ken of the jurors and because the
defendant's lay character witness already had testified to the defendant's non-
violent character. Id. The court did not rule on the lower court's suggestion
that the expert testimony was irrelevant for the additional reason that it was a
personality analysis and not a prediction of human behavior. Id. at 710 n.1.
205. The fear some courts express about expert conclusions that embrace
the "ultimate issue" is that the jury will defer to that opinion and abdicate its
decision-making duties. The Federal Rules of Evidence and many state rules
of evidence, however, have abandoned the rule that opinion testimony may not
embrace an ultimate issue. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 704. The opinion still must
be helpful and not prejudicial. Applying these principles, several courts have
admitted expert testimony having "ultimate issue" characteristics similar to
that of RTS testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1246
(9th Cir. 1980) (physician's opinion that a victim suffered serious bodily injury
admitted in criminal assault case); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1351
(9th Cir. 1977) (psychiatrist's and psychologist's opinions that appellant acted
voluntarily at the time of a robbery admitted in robbery case), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1000 (1978); State v. Miller, 254 Iowa 545, 554, 117 N.W.2d 447, 453 (1962)
(examining physician's opinion that victim was forcibly raped admitted in rape
case); People v. Stull, 127 Mich. App. 14, 19, 338 N.W.2d 403, 406 (1983) (rape
counselor's opinion that victim's behavior after rape was consistent with the
profile of a rape victim admitted in rape case); People v. LaPorte, 103 Mich.
App. 444, 451-52, 303 N.W.2d 222, 225 (1981) (examining physician's opinion
that complainant was a legitimate rape victim admitted in rape case); People v.
Wells, 102 Mich. App. 558, 560-62, 302 N.W.2d 232, 233 (1980) (examining physi-
cian's opinion that this was a "legitimate case of sexual assault" admitted in
consent-rape case); State v. Ring, 54 Wash. 2d 250, 254-55, 339 P.2d 461, 464
(1959) (examining physician's opinion that victim's physical condition "could
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deemed clearly relevant in a rape case and admissibility of this
evidence is beyond doubt. A victim's psychic injuries are
equally relevant; the "fact" made more probable by evidence
that the victim suffers from RTS is that the victim did not con-
sent to the admitted intercourse.
As with physical bruises, proper cross-examination of an
expert about a victim's RTS symptoms can elicit whether other
explanations for the trauma symptoms exist and, if so, whether
those explanations contradict the inference that the trauma re-
sulted from the incident at issue. For example, the defense
could explore whether the victim had been raped or sexually
assaulted before in her life, a sad but significant possibility.206
Alternatively, the defense might question the victim regarding
other life events that might produce stress disorder symptoms,
such as death of a loved one, loss of a job, or other major stress-
ful incidents.
The time between the intercourse and the psychological
examination may also be an important factor for defense coun-
sel to consider. Although some RTS symptoms may endure in-
definitely,207 the acute phase begins immediately after the
assault. A psychologist or psychiatrist who first interviews the
victim months after an attack may be unable to detect accu-
rately symptoms of the two-phase cycle20S because the exam-
iner must rely on the victim's memory and account of her prior
emotional, psychological, and behavioral symptoms.209 Of
course, a psychologist or psychiatrist making a diagnosis and
not have been the result of 'ordinary normal sexual intercourse'" admitted in
consent-rape case); State v. Mulder, 29 Wash. App. 513, 515-16, 629 P.2d 462,
463 (1981) (physician's opinion that injuries of child were nonaccidental and
result of "battered child syndrome" admitted in murder case) (collecting
cases). But see, ag., Farley v. State, 324 So. 2d 662, 663-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975), cert denied, 336 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1976); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 350
Mass. 664, 666, 216 N.E.2d 558, 560 (1966); State v. Barker, 53 Ohio St. 2d 135,
144-45, 372 N.E.2d 1324, 1331, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978); State v. Castore,
435 A.2d 321, 326 (R.I. 1981); Cartera v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 516, 519, 248
S.E.2d 784, 786 (1978).
206. See Ruch & Hennessy, supra note 137, at 103.
207. See supra note 165.
208. See supra notes 126-40 and accompanying text.
209. Bonnie and Slobogin suggest several ways that a mental health profes-
sional could test the reliability of a client's account. For example, the clinician
could conduct multiple interviews, separated by several days; attend to non-
verbal cues that register sincerity or ambivalence; administer a psychological
test such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Index that includes a scale
designed to reflect whether a client responded truthfully to the test questions;
or use hypnosis, a polygraph test, or data from other sources to help determine
whether the client's account is truthful. Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of
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proposing treatment must always depend on a patient's mem-
ory and perception, as well as sincerity, in relating symptoms.
The expert's own observations of the patient's response are a
valuable but necessary supplement. As a result, an expert's re-
liance on the patient's account of her symptoms instead of di-
rect observation of the Phase I symptoms does not make the
expert's conclusions irrelevant. It may produce potential relia-
bility and credibility problems, but these problems properly go
to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.
b. The Helpfulness of RTS
In finding RTS not helpful to the jury, the three courts
make erroneous assumptions about the four aspects of helpful-
ness. The following application of all four factors (does the
jury already know the information; will the jury be confused,
prejudiced, or overawed by it; is it reliable; will it consume too
much court time) demonstrates that RTS meets all four facets
of the helpfulness test.
i. Jury Knowledge
Jurors do not already know about the psychological and be-
havioral impact of rape. Indeed, the studies on what jurors
know about rape indicate that jurors enter the courtroom with
misassumptions and biases that will make them peculiarly un-
receptive to a woman's claim that admitted intercourse was
nonconsensual-especially in the absence of bruises, cuts, or
other physical injuries. 210 Expert testimony about RTS can as-
sist in overcoming this tendency of jurors to blame and disbe-
lieve the victim; it may reveal the psychological trauma
suffered by a victim, even though that trauma may have
progressed to the second, less obvious stage by the time of trial.
Jurors are not trained to identify trauma or evaluate the extent
of a victim's psychological injuries. Psychological experts, like
physicians diagnosing the extent of physical injuries, can better
diagnose and explain a victim's psychological injuries than can
an untrained person. Because the presence of either physical
or psychological injuries makes it more probable that inter-
course was not consensual, jurors need to know about all such
possible injuries in order to perform their duty of determining
Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed
Speculation, 66 VA. L. REv. 427, 505-06 & n.233 (1980).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 49-67; see also Ross, supra note 28,
at 713-17.
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whether rape has occurred. Expert testimony about RTS is
useful because it provides information about some possible psy-
chological injuries.
ii. Jury Confusion or Prejudice
The proper use of expert testimony about RTS need not
confuse, prejudice, or overawe the jury. The argument that
such expert psychological testimony is prejudicial because it
bears on the credibility of a witness, and thus invades the prov-
ince of the jury,211 is simply wrong. Expert testimony cannot
"invade the province of the jury" unless the jury is instructed
that it must agree with the expert's assessment.21 2 Indeed, put-
ting evidence before a jury that reflects on the credibility of
witnesses is common practice and any circumstantial evidence
that supports a victim's testimony will have the effect of "bol-
stering" credibility.213 The testimony of a medical doctor that
211. See, eg., People v. Acklin, 102 Misc. 2d 596, 601-02, 604, 606, 424
N.Y.S.2d 633, 638, 640, 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); State v. Jenkins, 260 N.W.2d
509, 513-14 (S.D. 1977); Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1200 (Wyo. 1977).
212. See State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, -, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219 (1983) ("[1]t
is impossible to usurp the jury's function. Even if there is uncontradicted ex-
pert testimony, the jury is not bound by it, for the jury alone must make the
ultimate decision."); see also State v. Bush, 260 N.W.2d 226, 231 (S.D. 1977)
(when there was conflicting expert testimony about defendant's mental state,
jury nevertheless could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt be-
cause deciding which testimony to credit is jury's function).
213. See, ag., State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 281-82, 415 A.2d 320, 322 (1980)
(rejecting argument that examining physician's testimony that memory loss is
not unusual in rape victims was an improper opinion on the victim's credibil-
ity, because, "[flollowing defendant's logic, opinion evidence would be ex-
cluded whenever it corroborated a witness's testimony"); Commonwealth v.
Stago, 267 Pa. Super. 90, 406 A.2d 533, 535 (1979) (rejecting argument that
treating psychologist's testimony that incest victims often felt depressed, an-
gry, and guilty and needed psychiatric care and hospitalization was an opinion
about the victim's credibility).
Some cases go further and approve expert testimony on credibility in ap-
propriate circumstances. See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 326 So. 2d 229, 230-31 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.) (ruling lower court erred in refusing to grant a continuance in
rape trial to allow defense to produce an examining psychiatrist who could
have testified that the child victim did not always tell the truth and had para-
noid tendencies), cert denied, 386 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1976); Mosley v. Common-
wealth, 420 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) (stating lower court erred in
excluding psychologist's testimony that victim was schizophrenic and imma-
ture, when testimony was offered to impeach her credibility); State v. Tafoya,
94 N.M. 762, 764, 617 P.2d 151, 153 (1980) (stating in dicta that New Mexico
evidence rules allow expert testimony to impeach the credibility of witnesses,
but the probative value must outweigh prejudicial effect; judge reserves discre-
tion); M. LEv & M. LEvrrr, A TISSUE OF LIES: NIXON V. HIss 160 (1979)
(discussing the Alger Hiss case, in which the court allowed expert testimony
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an alleged rape victim had bruises enhances the victim's credi-
bility and yet does not "invade the province of the jury." The
testimony of a psychiatrist or psychologist that a woman suffers
from RTS should also enhance the victim's credibility without
usurping the jury's duty to decide what circumstantial evidence
it chooses to believe.
Some critics of this last view assume that jurors will be so
overawed by the expert that they will abdicate their decision-
making responsibilities and simply agree with the expert. As a
result, the critics maintain, courts must be more careful about
expert testimony that encroaches on the jury's duties to decide
ultimate issues and evaluate credibility than with other, less
awesome evidence.214 Adherents to this view, however, cite no
data for their assumption that jurors are overawed by mental
health experts. Although empirical evidence on this issue is
limited, the available evidence suggests that the assumption is
wrong. Studies by Kalven and Zeisel25 and by Simon216 indi-
cate that jurors are not overawed by expert testimony. Simon
explains that "[t]he jury is too impressed with its importance as
an institution and with its responsibility to the court and to the
community at large to relinquish its decision-making pow-
ers."217 Kalven and Zeisel express similar faith in the jurors'
independence and ability to comprehend the facts.218
These findings suggest that withholding expert testimony
from jurors because it may prejudice or "overawe the jury" is
paternalistic. If the expert's testimony is too complex, the ju-
rors (and the judge, for that matter) may ignore it; if a battle of
that the witness "showed a psychopathic personality, one symptom of which
was pathological lying"). But see United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 49 (5th
Cir. 1978) ("[P]sychiatric opinions as to a witness' reliability in distinguishing
truth from fantasy is inadmissible for impeachment purposes, for it invades
the jury's province to make credibility determinations."). See generally Mc.
CORMICK, supra note 171, § 45, at 95-97; Saxe, Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and
the Credibility of Witnesses, 45 NOTRE DAME LAw. 238 (1975); Weihofen, Testi-
monial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 53, 68 (1965).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
215. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 50, at 177 n.12.
216. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 169-70 (1967).
217. Id. at 170.
218. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 50, at 153, 157-59. Similarly un-
founded is the fear that both sides will present so many experts with conflict-
ing views that the jury will be confused if not overawed. Kalven and Zelsel
found that "battles of experts" were infrequent; in only 3% of all cases did
both sides present experts. Id. at 139. Medical experts were used in only 12%
of all cases, and psychiatrists testified in less than 2%. Id. at 139-40. In rape
cases, the prosecution used experts in 28% of the cases; the defense used no
experts. Id at 142 & table 40, 143 & table 41.
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experts ensues, fact finders again are likely to discount the evi-
dence; if neither occurs, the indications are that the jury will
not treat the expert's testimony as conclusive even then.219
This may be especially true when the expert is a psychologist,
psychiatrist, or expert in the "social sciences" 220 rather than a
physicist, ballistics expert, or other expert in the "hard sci-
ences." Even these latter experts, however, have been shown
not to overawe the jury. 22 '
The law's resistance to admitting expert psychological testi-
mony on credibility is ironic. Judges and jurors consistently
make decisions that are based on inferences, speculation, and
intuition. Like psychologists, the fact finders rely on their own
interpretations of a person's words, actions, and demeanor in
deciding questions of perception, intent, credibility, motive, and
fact. Unlike psychologists, however, they conduct their inquiry
with no special training in human behavior or psychology, after
only brief encounters with the witnesses, and in a setting and
pursuant to a procedure that never has been shown to produce
the most accurate results. If the substantive law compels the
fact finder to assess how people think and behave in certain sit-
uations and psychology can offer information about that
thought and behavior, it seems unreasonable to exclude expert
evidence that might help the fact finder, forcing untrained ju-
rors to draw conclusions based on untested hunches and
intuition.=2
219. IL KALVEN & IL ZEIsEL, supra note 50, at 177 n.12 ("[ln the case of
expert witnesses, the judge never offers as a reason for disagreement [with the
jury] the differential response to the expert's persuasiveness.").
220. Id.; see also Imwinkelreid, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evi-
dence: A Critique From the Perspective of Jurar Psychology, 28 VILL. L REV.
554, 566-71 (1983). Imwinkelreid observes that psychiatry in particular has re-
ceived "extensive adverse publicity," especially after the 1982 trial of John
Hinckley, Jr., making it even less likely jurors will be overawed. Id. at 569
n.Ml2. He also argues that the discrimination against scientific evidence in gen-
eral misses the point, because such criticism focuses on internal reliability of
evidence without comparing that evidence's reliability to that of available al-
ternatives, such as eyewitness testimony. Id. at 564-65; see also Bonnie &
Slobogin, supra note 209, at 463-66 & n.121 (arguing that laypersons are natu-
rally skeptical of psychology and that the knowledge of mental health profes-
sionals should be compared, not with the knowledge of physicists, but with
that of laypersons about psychological aberrations and criminal behavior).
22L See, e.g., sources cited inffra note 227.
222. The United States Supreme Court recently expressed a similar atti-
tude toward expert psychiatric testimony in a death penalty case involving ex-
pert predictions of future dangerousness. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct.
3383 (1983). The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the psychiatric
testimony against him was so unreliable that his sentence should be set aside,
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Some of the resistance to expert psychological testimony
on credibility may spring from judicial experience with other
scientific evidence on credibility. For example, judicial resist-
ance to lie-detector results may prompt arguments that psychi-
atrists or psychologists who give opinions are acting as lie
detectors223 and by analogy should not be allowed to testify as
to the witness's veracity.2 24 Again, the argument fails. Analo-
gizing a psychologist or psychiatrist to a lie detector is irrele-
vant unless the reasons for exclusion of lie detector results
apply to expert psychological testimony. The major objection
to lie detector results, however, is not primarily that of test re-
liability-the reliability of polygraph results is sufficiently high
to satisfy relevance standards225--but of prejudice, because it is
assumed that jurors give polygraph results undue weight and
thus a mechanical device rather than the jury would decide
credibility.226 Regardless of whether that assumption is valid
stating that "[i]f the jury may make up its mind about future dangerousness
unaided by psychiatric testimony, jurors should not be barred from hearing
the views of the State's psychiatrists along with opposing views of the defend-
ant's doctors." Id at 3397.
223. See State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 606 n.12, 645 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12
(1982).
224. See, e.g., Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Exper-
tise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 736-37 (1974).
225. See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962); 1 J.
ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 4 (3d ed.
1981) (estimating that opinions about truthfulness based on polygraph inter-
pretation by qualified experts are correct 75% of the time).
226. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 502-03, 505 (Me. 1978) (distin-
guishing voice-print evidence from lie-detector evidence on basis that lie detec-
tors impinge on fact finder's duty to assess credibility and voice prints do not);
cf. United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 (D. Md. 1973) (excluding
polygraph test results, citing, inter alia, subjectivity of test results and absence
of national standards for education of polygraph examiners).
The interesting aspect of the polygraph cases is that they reflect an atti-
tude of resistance to scientific evidence regardless of its reliability. Presuma-
bly, the alternative means of assessing credibility-jurors' assessments of a
witness's credibility based on in-court observation-is also unreliable, perhaps
even more so. Even if polygraph results were 95% reliable, and were offered
only in nonjury cases, chances are that some opponents still would not favor
their admissibility.
The root of this resistance to a more scientific justice system may be an
instinctive preference for people's judgments--even if erroneous--over those
of machines. Once science begins to supplement the fact-finding process, the
issue immediately arises of where the limits should be drawn and when the
jurors should be allowed to decide the facts without additional, specialized In-
formation. This inquiry leads very quickly to imponderable questions, such as
"What is truth?," "How do we perceive?," and so forth--questions that the
legal system rarely asks itself (at least not consciously), because the partici-
pants are not trained to engage in this kind of intellectual or philosophical in-
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for polygraph results,7 it does not apply to expert psychologi-
cal testimony because such testimony does not involve a
mechanical device impervious to effective cross-examination.
iii. Evidence Reliability
Despite the arguments of the Minnesota and Missouri
courts that RTS evidence is not reliable because such symptoms
may flow from any psychologically traumatic event, experts be-
lieve that RTS evidence is highly reliable. RTS symptoms are
similar but not identical to other posttraumatic stress-disorder
symptoms, and the stress reactions of rape victims often are re-
lated to the incident in ways that distinguish that reaction from
reactions to other life stress. For example, if a victim were
raped in her apartment, she may experience fear of being in-
doors-a reaction that would not necessarily flow from other
types of stress.228 Similarly, rape victims often develop a fear
of men, a reaction not common to nonrape psychological
trauma.2 9
Furthermore, even if the symptoms were identical to other
stress disorder symptoms, RTS evidence still would be helpful
to the jury. If the victim had suffered a physical bruise, no one
would argue that the fact of the bruise is irrelevant to the issue
of nonconsent or that a doctor's testimony about that bruise is
unreliable simply because this "symptom" is consistent with
other causes. Similarly, if a victim manifests the psychological
patterns and other RTS symptoms shown to be common to
quiry and because the legal system's efficacy depends on its ability to resolve
disputes promptly and in a way average citizens can comprehend. The jury
system of adjudicating facts reflects a conscious rejection of the laboratory or
library in favor of human instinct and intuition. So error-perhaps a large
percentage of it-is endured because how legal decisions are made is as impor-
tant to their acceptability as whether they are accurate. The advantages of
this system are normally weighed against the disadvantages, however, and
what scientific evidence is reasonably necessary to assist the jury in making
rational, prompt, equitable, and accurate results is added to the process.
227. Studies on this issue suggest that jurors are not overawed by poly-
graph evidence. See, e.g., Carlson, Pasano & Januzzo, The Effect of Lie Detec-
tor Evidence on Jury Deliberations: An Empirical Study, 5 J. POLICE SCi. &
AD. 148, 152 (1977) (jurors unlikely to change vote on basis of polygraph evi-
dence in conflict with their original vote); Markwart & Lynch, The Effect of
Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jury Decision-Making, 7 J. POLICE SCI. & AD.
324, 330-31 (1979) ("almost 2 in 5 persons expressed little or no confidence in
polygraphs").
228. See supra text accompanying note 135.
229. See supra text accompanying note 146.
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most victims of rape, then a permissible and plausible inference
is that she is a rape victim.
Nor can RTS testimony be deemed unreliable because it is
too novel or lacks support among the relevant scientific com-
munity. Over ten years have elapsed since the RTS theory was
first advanced, research on rape victimology has mushroomed,
yet no one writing on rape victimology seriously contests the
RTS theory. Several researchers in studies on the impact of
rape have corroborated Burgess and Holmstrom's original find-
ings, 230 and clinical psychologists and research psychologists use
the model in therapy and as a research tool. Consequently, if
courts apply their stated standards for admissibility of scientific
evidence, they should accept RTS as a reliable theory because it
has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community.231
A caveat to the foregoing is suggested by the argument that
the relevant scientific community uses RTS theory as a thera-
peutic tool in counseling rather than as a fact-finding tool. Psy-
chiatrists and psychologists do not, the courts assume, use RTS
to uncover whether the complainant was raped but as a means
of evaluating what type of therapy is indicated for patients who
come to them and allege they have been raped. Because the
theory merely assumes that rape occurred, the argument con-
tinues, the theory cannot be applied in an inverse fashion-by
identifying RTS symptoms in a patient and then concluding
that the patient's symptoms were caused by rape-because that
230. See, e.g., J. BARKAS, VIcTIMs 124-27 (1978) (an intensive 1975 study of
rape victims at a Miami hospital showed that women suffer from a wide range
of after-effects); S. KATz & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM 216
(1979) (listing studies showing that most rape victims develop psychiatric
symptoms and behavioral changes following rape).
231. Other types of expert testimony that courts routinely admit in crimi-
nal trials are subject to substantial error or disagreement. As Saks and Kidd
report,
[A]lthough the expert may be confident of the conclusions testified to,
this or another expert could inform the court about relevant back-
ground findings such as those of the Forensic Sciences Association in
a national study (Peterson et al., 1978) showing that as many as 51
percent of police laboratories misidentified paint samples, 71 percent
misidentified blood samples, and 28 percent misidentified firearms.
Saks & Kidd, Human Informational Processing and Adjudication: Trial by
Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 123, 155 (1980-1981). Nonscientific evidence
also is subject to error, as the research on memory and eyewitness testmony
makes clear. See generally E. LOFTUs, MEMORY (1980); MCCORMICK, supra
note 171, § 206; Gardners, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 Cori-
NELL L.Q. 391 (1933).
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inverse inference never has been tested in the studies of rape
victims.
This argument has superficial appeal when examined in
isolation. Simply stated, it says that proof that a known x leads
to y does not prove that x is the only cause of y, such that the
presence of y will always mean x and only x. For example,
proof that people who are known to be left-handed tend to
have certain characteristics does not mean that all people who
have those characteristics are left-handed. Consequently, a
study outlining the characteristics of x would not be reliable for
identifying y, and one describing left-handed people would not
be an appropriate, reliable test for identifying left-handers.
This analysis is flawed both in its basic assumptions and in
its conclusion. First, the RTS theory can be used by clinicians
as a diagnostic tool: Burgess and Holmstrom noted that be-
cause a significant number of women suffer silently rather than
report rapes, clinicians should consider a diagnosis of silent re-
action to a past rape when a woman shows increasing anxiety
as the interview progresses or reports sudden marked irritabil-
ity, avoidance of relationships with men, change in sexual be-
havior, sudden onset of phobic reactions, dreams of violence, or
other symptoms of RTS.232
Second, RTS symptoms are hardly usual or common occur-
rences. People tend not to form phobic reactions, to be pro-
foundly fearful or depressed, or to have recurring nightmares.
Likewise, people do not tend suddenly to move, change their
phone numbers, or cease being interested in sex. When those
symptoms occur in a woman who alleges she has been raped,
and when they occur in a cycle consistent with that exper-
ienced by other rape victims, the logical inference is that she is
the victim of a sexual assault. Rape is not the only inference,
but it is a plausible one. All possible causes of aberrant symp-
toms of trauma can be considered and accounted for in court
and in the therapist's office.
One part of the unreliability argument is that the victim
might lie about the assault and "fake" her symptoms. The fear
that complainants will fake RTS symptoms, however, is as un-
founded as the fear that women will falsely cry rape. First
RTS symptoms are not self-evident: a potential lying "victim"
would have to do substantial research in order to learn just
232. Burgess & Holnstrom, supra note 125, at 128. Burgess and Holm-
strom suggest in another book that clinicians do use RTS to diagnose and treat
rape victims. See BuRGEss & HOLMusrROM, supra note 133, at 449-52.
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what to fake. Second, even if a person tried to fake RTS symp-
toms, a qualified treating psychologist or psychiatrist would be
aware of deviations from common reactions and might well
conclude from experience that this patient is not truthfully re-
lating her symptoms. Third, the victim and the expert would
be available in the courtroom where the jury could observe
their demeanor and the defendant could attack the victim's
credibility, the expert's credibility, and the reliability of the
theory. Fourth, the disincentives to crying rape, and the per-
sonal and intimate nature of counseling or psychotherapy, fur-
ther reduce the likelihood that women will lie to a treating
psychiatrist or psychologist about a consensual sexual
encounter.
It is possible, of course, that someone might lie about con-
sensual intercourse, call it rape, complain to the police, conduct
research on RTS, go to a psychiatrist, psychologist, or rape
counselor, fabricate the RTS symptoms she has researched, and
convince everyone that she is suffering from those symptoms.
The risk of this sequence of events, however, is easily overesti-
mated and is likely no greater, if not less, than the risk of false
accusations that exists with any crime.
In addition to the "therapeudic only" objection, a second
argument that RTS is not a reliable indication of rape signifi-
cantly influenced the California decision to exclude the expert
testimony. California criminal law determines consent to sex-
ual intercourse by the defendant's reasonable, good faith per-
ception, not by the victim's perception. 33 Thus, the court
concluded, it is possible that in some cases the victim may not
believe she consented and thus may manifest trauma symp-
toms, even though the crime of rape has not been committed.34
The court was concerned that none of the studies on RTS in-
cludes attempts to verify the victims' recollections of the inci-
dent or to determine the "legal implication"235 of their
accounts. It was also apparently disturbed because rape has a
legal meaning that researchers may not have understood or in-
tended to convey when they developed the RTS theory. The
reactions of women in those studies thus may not have been re-
actions to legal rapes but to sexual encounters that the women
233. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, - n.12, 681 P.2d 291, 300 n.12, 203
Cal. Rptr. 450, 459 n.12.
234. Id.
235. Id. at -, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
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or the researchers perceived as rape.236 An expert cannot,
therefore, prejudice the jurors by suggesting that because a vic-
tim suffers from RTS symptoms, she was raped. The California
justices quickly added, however, that testimony about a com-
plainant's emotional and psychological trauma after an alleged
rape is admissible.237
This is a curious and circular argument. By approving ad-
mission of evidence about a victim's emotional and psychologi-
cal trauma, the judges contradict their own earlier suggestion
that the victim's perception of an incident as a rape is irrele-
vant. Whether an expert or a layperson testifies about a vic-
tim's trauma, the testimony still is an assessment of the victim's
reaction, which obviously is affected by her perception of the
incident. The California court presumably would not argue
that hysteria, crying, nervousness, phobic reactions, or other ev-
idence of trauma in a woman who alleges she was raped is irrel-
evant, even though the criminal law focuses on the defendant's
reasonable perception, not the complainant's. The reactions of
the victim are admissible because they have a tendency to
prove that her version of the sexual encounter is correct.
Again, the reactions do not prove it; they have a tendency to
prove it.
Furthermore, even if stress reactions do occur in women
who claim nonconsensual intercourse but whom courts find not
236. Holmstrom and Burgess define rape as "forced, violent sexual pene-
tration against the victim's will and without the victim's consent." Holmstrom
& Burgess, supra note 123, at 111. They specifically address the legal implica-
tions of a diagnosis of rape as follows:
Certain diagnoses-rape, for example, or battered child syn-
drome-may also entail criminal charges. The diagnosis has not only
treatment implications for the patient but legal implications for an-
other person, who may become a defendant charged with a criminal
offense.
The court, to determine whether a crime was committed, has the
right to subpoena the hospital record and expert witnesses, usually
physicians. But as nurses expand their role, they may come to be de-
fined as expert witnesses. By these procedures, the criminal justice
system places the hospital staff in the role of detective.
Wbile staff may not object to recording signs and symptoms, they
may want to discuss whether to write down such a diagnosis as rape.
Policy will not permit staff in some hospitals to be placed in the posi-
tion of detective; policy may prohibit recording a presenting complaint
of rape. Instead, the physician writes "gyn injury."
At Boston City Hospital, physicians avoid the designation of rape.
No matter how clear-cut the evidence, the diagnosis is written as "al-
leged rape," "rape case for evaluation," or "diagnosis deferred."
Id. at 117.
237. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at _, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
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to have been raped, the presence of trauma symptoms in a rape
complainant should not be excluded simply because a court
may ultimately find the defendant reasonably perceived con-
sent. Some women may be physically bruised in consensual in-
tercourse, and some may be physically bruised during
intercourse that they perceive as coerced but that is not found
to be rape. Yet the physical bruise nevertheless tends to prove
nonconsent and so is probative. Psychological trauma likewise
tends to prove nonconsent and should be accepted as probative.
Finally, RTS research can be explained to the jury or judge
in a way that avoids the implication of ascertaining legal
rape.238 For example, the expert can avoid the term "rape" in
describing RTS and instead use the term "post-traumatic stress
disorder." The expert may also be prohibited from opining that
the complainant was legally raped but may be allowed to ex-
plain that the victim's trauma is consistent with that of other
people who have reported being victims of nonconsensual inter-
course. Though this may seem a semantic ploy, it is one that
the California court seems to require.
238. The California court was concerned that the studies of rape victims do
not include follow-up work to verify that the victim was raped. But no re-
search could be conducted that would isolate only true rape victims unless per-
haps it included only victims whose rape was determined to be a "legal" rape
by a court of law. Perhaps ironically, Williams and Holmes note that their
study of the aftermath of rape included mostly victims of "stereotypic as-
saults," that is, victims raped by strangers, without warning, who were
threatened ("preferably" with a weapon) and suffered observable injury. They
explain that other rape situations
were most likely selected out by the victims who elected not to report
to the police, not to seek medical treatment, and not to contact a rape
crisis program. The most obvious examples of so-called questionable
assaults are those that occur within the context of what is generally
consensual social interaction ("date rapes"), those in which the assail-
ant is a former husband or lover, and those in which the victim her-
self feels somehow responsible for what happened, perhaps because of
poor judgment or carelessness.
J. WILLIAMS & K. HoLMEs, supra note 33, at 81. The self-reporting nature of
the sample selection in the rape research studies makes those results more re-
liable, not less so, given the documented and marked tendency of women not
to report "questionable" rapes and the researchers' definition of rape as forci-
ble, violent sexual penetration. See supra note 236. The court may have con-
fused therapy with research. Although practicing psychologists, psychiatrists,
and rape counselors may suspend judgment in treating self-reporting rape-vic-
tim clients, researchers probably are more discriminating. This would explain
why Burgess and Holmstrom chose only 92 of the 146 women who alleged they
had been raped as the research sample. See supra text accompanying notes
122-23. Doubtless the remaining 54 complaining victims nevertheless were
given treatment by Boston City Hospital.
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iv. Proper use of court time
The final test of helpfulness is whether expert testimony
on credibility consumes too much court time on an issue that is
collateral to the primary issues of the case.23 9 In a consent-rape
case, credibility is not simply a collateral issue. Indeed, some
courts exclude psychological testimony in consent-rape cases on
the basis that the only real issue is the credibility of the parties
and that issue is for the jury to decide without the influence of
experts.24o Moreover, the additional court time this expert tes-
timony would consume presumably would be no greater than
the time spent on testimony by statisticians in employment dis-
crimination suits, by physicians in personal injury suits, or by
forensics experts in other criminal cases.
D. COMPULSORY PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATIONS
Dean Wigmore urged that psychiatric examination of the
complainant in a sexual assault case be mandatory.241 He be-
lieved, and some writers agree,= that the examination is
239. McCormick notes that two of the reasons for excluding relevant evi-
dence are the probability that proof will "create a side issue" and the likeli-
hood that evidence will "consume an undue amount of time." MCCORMICK.
supra note 171, § 185, at 439-40; see also State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 239
(Mo. 1984) (en banc) (court may "exclude evidence if it unnecessarily diverts
the attention of the jury from the question to be decided").
240. See, ag., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Minn. 1984) (conclud-
ing that the admission of a rape counselor's testimony was error because the
sole issue was whether the sexual intercourse was voluntary and credibility
was the sole province of the jury); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo.
1984) (excluding psychological testimony because "[t]he only real issue was
whether the intercourse was forcible or consensual ... [and the] jury could
determine whether the intercourse was forcible based on its own evaluation of
the physical evidence and testimony and credibility of the witnesses"). To ar-
gue that the victim's credibility is a key aspect of a consent-rape case is not to
suggest that her credibility should be scrutinized in ways that have no rele-
vance to the incident. Nevertheless, as long as misperceptions about rape per-
sist and jurors continue to carry these misperceptions into the courtroom,
victim credibility will, rightly or wrongly, remain a key factor in a rape case.
Thus, although extrinsic evidence of a witness's credibility ordinarily is inad-
missible, this rule alone should not bar expert testimony on credibility in con-
sent-rape cases.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
242. See, e.g., McCOMUCK, supra note 171, § 45, at 95-96; A. MoE-NssENs &
F. INBAU, supra note 121, at 131-32; Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credi-
bility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CAUF. L. REV. 648, 676 (1060)
(favoring exam when corroborative evidence is lacking and defendant can con-
firm the need for the exam); Saxe, supra note 213, at 244-45; Weihofen, supra
note 213, at 73-75 (but cautioning that it may be premature to require the ex-
amination in every prosecution for a sex offense); Note, Complainant Credibil.
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greatly needed because it can help determine whether the vic-
tim is fabricating the charge of rape as a result of some psycho-
logical disorder. No jurisdiction has adopted Wigmore's
extreme position that the examination be mandatory in all
cases, and the factual basis for Wigmore's fear of fabrication
has been discredited.243 Nevertheless, many courts maintain
that a judge has inherent authority to order a psychiatric exam-
ination of a complainant in narrow and compelling circum-
stances, such as when the charge is uncorroborated or when the
defendant adduces evidence to suggest that the complainant
may suffer from a psychological disorder.244
Opponents of compulsory psychiatric examinations main-
tain that the examination invades the privacy of the victim,
that the results may not be valuable because the examination is
mandatory, that psychiatrists are trained to determine a mental
defect or disorder and not credibility, that requiring the exami-
nation for rape victims treats them differently from victims of
ity in Sexual Offense Cases: A Survey of Character Testimony and Psychiatric
Experts, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 67, 71, 75 (1973); Note, Psychiatric
Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324, 1328, 1338-
39 (1950); cf. Berger, supra note 28, at 68-69 (favoring order of exam in compel-
ling circumstances); Conrad, Mental Examination of Witnesses, 11 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 149 (1960) (discussing credibility of witnesses in general). But see
O'Neale, Court Ordered Psychiatric Examination of a Rape Victim in a Crim-
inal Rape Prosecution-Or How Many Times Must a Woman Be Raped?, 18
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 119 (1978) (criticizing Wigmore and questioning the
ability of an expert psychologist or psychiatrist to determine credibility).
243. See O'Neale, supra note 242, at 133-38 (exploring traditional attitudes
and exposing lack of basis for them); supra text accompanying notes 100-06.
244. For cases acknowledging court authority to order psychiatric examina-
tion of the complaining witness in sexual offense cases, see Government of
Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869, 874-76 (3d Cir. 1980) (acknowledging au-
thority but upholding trial court's denial of defendant's motion for exam); Bal-
lard v. Superior Ct., 64 Cal. 2d 159, 177, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 313
(1966) (abrogated by 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 16, § 1 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1112 (West Supp. 1984))); McDonald v. State, 307 A.2d 796, 798 (Del. 1973);
Dinkins v. State, 244 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (in extreme cir-
cumstances); Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 16-17, 256 N.E.2d 901, 903 (1970);
State v. Maestas, 190 Neb. 312, 314, 207 N.W.2d 699, 700 (1973); State v. Clasey,
252 Or. 22, 24, 446 P.2d 116, 117 (1968). Even those courts that acknowledge
their power to order examinations state that this power should be exercised
only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the charge is uncorroborated
or when the defendant can produce evidence that the complainant may suffer
from a mental disorder. In nearly every reported appellate case, the court up-
held the trial judge's denial of defendant's motion for a court-ordered exami-
nation.
For a case holding that courts lack inherent power to order a complainant
to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, see United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340,
342 (D.D.C. 1966). See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 (1968).
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other crimes who are not required to submit to an exam, that
the evidence will distract the jury and waste time, and that the
underlying rationale for the examination is a perverse view of
women as liars or hysterics.245 Such criticism prompted Cali-
fornia in 1981 to prohibit court-ordered examinations.24 6
Given these criticisms of court-ordered examinations of
complainants in rape cases, a proposal that the prosecution's
RTS evidence should be admissible may raise the spectre of
further harm to a complainant. That is, if presence of RTS is
probative evidence that a woman has been raped, then absence
of RTS might be probative evidence that she has not been
raped,247 and a defendant arguably should have access to that
information. This access might be construed to include the
right to compel all complainants to submit to examinations or
to release records of any private therapy or voluntary counsel-
ing pursued by complainants.248 Either alternative could have
245. See, ag., O'Neale, supra note 242, at 119-21, 146-50. See also United
States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 49 (5th Cir. 1978), where the court quoted the
district court to the effect that
a court-ordered medical examination is an infringement on a witness'
privacy, and this factor must be taken into account by the district
court .... 'The examination itself could serve as a tool of harass-
ment, and the likelihood of an examination could deter witnesses
from coming forward, producing a chilling effect in crime detection."
246. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West Supp. 1984).
247. This is not necessarily so. The psychological research has focused on
discovery and treatment of trauma of persons complaining of sexual assault. It
indicates that most, not all, victims suffer from the characteristic symptoms of
RTS. Therefore, the inference that one who suffers from RTS is a rape victim
is different from the inference that one who does not suffer from RTS is not a
rape victim. The studies on RTS support the former inference; they do not
necessarily support the latter.
248. The director of a rape crisis center in Pittsburgh was held in contempt
for refusing access to records of a rape victim. See Pittsburgh Action Against
Rape v. Pride, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981). The court held that a court
could authorize defendant's counsel to inspect the statements of the victim
contained in the file. The court rejected the appellants argument that the
communications were absolutely privileged. Defense counsel sought the
records to impeach the complainant. Id at 27-28, 428 A.2d at 131-32.
A defendant could conceivably argue that access to such information from
a complainant's therapist, counselor, or psychiatrist is vital to his constitu-
tional right to defend himself, as it may contain material evidence favorable to
him. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (refusal to admit evi-
dence of another's confession to crime charged or to permit impeachment of
the other's subsequent denial violates due process); Washington v. Texas,; 388
U.S. 14 (1967) (refusal to admit testimony of convicted coparticipant in crime
violated due process); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (same). See gener-
ally Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional
Guarantee in Criminal Trlals, 9 IND. L. REv. 711 (1976).
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adverse effects, such as deterring a complainant who has sought
counseling from reporting a rape out of fear that confidential
information from her therapy will be disclosed, deterring a
complainant who reports her rape from seeking counseling, and
compounding a victim's trauma and violation by opening to
public view her private thoughts, feelings, and behavior as they
may relate to her sexual assault.
There is, however, a third alternative that would accommo-
date adequately both the complainant's privacy and the defend-
ant's right to evidence. When a complainant voluntarily seeks
counseling, crisis intervention, or psychotherapy, and the prose-
cution does not call her therapist or counselor as a witness,
then her communications with the therapist or counselor
should be privileged. The defendant should not be entitled to
discover the communications or the expert's opinions or find-
ings based on the communications. Moreover, the court should
not order the victim to submit to an examination by the de-
fendant's expert absent a showing of the compelling and unu-
sual circumstances that have traditionally been required for
such an order.
If the prosecution decides to hire a nontreating expert to
evaluate the complainant but does not intend to call the expert
as a witness, the defendant should be entitled, on proper mo-
tion, to the limited discovery of results or reports favorable to
him, as determined by a trial judge in an in camera review of
the evidence. 249 Again, the court should not order an examina-
249. This suggestion is based on criminal discovery rules and constitutional
requirements. In some jurisdictions, criminal discovery rules may compel dis-
closure of any relevant reports or statements of experts made in connection
with the particular case, including results of mental examinations. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D). The report, however, typically must be material
to the defendant's defense or intended for use by the government in its case-
in-chief. Moreover, these discovery rules exempt privileged material.
The United States Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963), that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment." The Court explained in a later case that "implicit
in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence
might have affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 104 (1976). This requirement means more than a "mere possibility" that
the evidence might have helped the defense. Id. at 109-10; see also Hilliard v.
Spalding, 719 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1983) (evidence is material if it would
have created a reasonable doubt that was not already there); United States v.
Pitt, 717 F.2d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Due process mandates the disclosure
of favorable evidence, material for exculpatory or impeachment purposes, to
an accused upon request . ) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1421 (1984).
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tion of the complainant absent compelling circumstances.
If, however, the prosecution decides to call a treating or
nontreating expert to testify about the complainant's symp-
toms, the defendant should be entitled to discovery and inspec-
tion of the results of this expert's examination.2 50 The
defendant also should be entitled to a court order compelling
the complainant to submit to an examination by the defend-
ant's expert. If the complainant refuses to submit to an exami-
nation by defendant's expert, however, or if the court decides
that she should not be compelled to undergo this examination,
the state should be prohibited from calling its expert as a wit-
ness. 25 If the defendant's expert testifies, the scope of that ex-
pert's testimony about the complainant should be restricted to
topics relevant to a diagnosis of RTS. The state's decision to in-
troduce expert testimony on RTS should not open the door to
character evidence or other impeachment evidence unrelated to
the RTS diagnosis. When the state decides to call a nontreating
expert-such as Holmstrom or Burgess-to testify generally
about the RTS theory and research, the defendant should be
entitled to discovery of the expert's name and address and any
reports or statements the expert may have made in connection
with the case.
This alternative gives the complainant some control over
the defendant's access to RTS evidence, yet the result is consis-
tent with the purpose of privileges, with policy, and with prece-
dent. Privileges are created to promote relationships that
depend for their existence on confidentiality between the par-
ties. The need for the privilege must outweigh the accused's
right to evidence.z 2 Although the balance struck between
these interests varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the mod-
ern trend is to protect psychotherapist-patient communications
either by statute or through case law. This is true, despite
growing criticism of privileges in other areas, primarily because
of people's recognition of the compelling need for confidential-
ity associated with psychiatric or psychological counseling.=
This need is equally compelling, if not more so, in the context
of counseling of rape victims, who may find their usual support
250. See generally Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals.: Lawyers and
Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 623-25 (1980).
251. The complainant, however, still should be allowed to testify to her
symptoms.
252. Saltzburg, supra note 250, at 616-24.
253. Id at 619-21.
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systems unhelpful or even hostile should they reveal that they
were raped.
Once the prosecution decides to introduce expert testimony
based on these communications, however, the interest in pre-
serving victim confidentiality must give way to the accused's
right to meet that evidence with effective cross-examination. 25 4
Therefore, if a complainant decides she does not want the de-
fendant to have access to the communications, the prosecution
should respect that determination as consistent with public pol-
icy and should forego expert testimony on RTS. The policy in-
terest in protecting a rape victim's privacy also is expressed in
the "rape shield" statutes, which exclude reputation or opinion
evidence about her past sexual behavior.255
This alternative will not impair the defendant's ability to
defend himself. Defendants currently do not ordinarily have
access to private psychological evaluations or therapy records of
complainants. 256 The low conviction rate in consent-rape cases,
however, indicates that defendants are able to defend them-
selves adequately through the usual cross-examination tech-
niques and attacks on the victim's credibility. Furthermore, no
criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to obtain all evi-
dence that the prosecution or a witness possesses.257 Court-or-
dered physical or mental examinations of witnesses are
exceptional and rare occurrences, restricted primarily to sexual
254. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412.
255. See, e.g., People v. Lowe, 96 Misc. 2d 33, 38, 408 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1978).
256. But see supra note 248.
257. For example, the United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously in
California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984), that the Constitution does not
require California to preserve breath samples of drivers who submit to a
breath test, even though it was possible to save the breath samples for later
verification. The state need only preserve evidence "that might be expected to
play a significant role in the suspect's defense." Id. at 2534. Given the accu-
racy of breathalyzer test results, the breath samples rarely would help defend-
ants. The Court noted that defendants in California are entitled to inspect the
machine used to test their breath. Id. at 2534-35.
Thus, even though the state used the results of the breath test against the
defendant and then discarded that evidence-rendering it unavailable to the
defendant-the Court found no violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights. This suggests that the approach to RTS evidence proposed herein ade-
quately protects the defendant's constitutional rights. The evaluation results
would be available to the defendant whenever the state intended to use those
results against the defendant. Moreover, the defendant would be entitled to
conduct his own evaluation. Finally, the results would be available whenever
they were procured by the state and favorable to the defendant.
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assault cases.258 Privileges and work-product protection further
limit defendants' rights to discover the state's evidence against
them.259 To restrict a rape defendant's access to the results of a
psychological examination of a complainant in the manner de-
scribed is thus neither unusual nor unfair. Defense counsel on
cross-examination can attack the expert's credentials, experi-
ence, and training, the underlying theory, method, and evalua-
tion techniques; and the expert's evaluation and conclusions in
the case sub judice. The defendant can also, when his finances
permit, hire his own experts.260
Finally, it is important to remember that expert psycholog-
ical testimony on RTS is not expert psychological testimony
258. See supra note 244 and accompanying text; see also People v. Acklin,
102 Misc. 2d 596, 605, 424 N.Y.S.2d 633, 604 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (noting that "a
dear and substantial demonstration of necessity and justification" would have
to be made before a court would order the psychiatric examination of a wit-
ness). An interesting twist on the compulsory examination arose in State v.
Jackson, 97 N.M. 467, 641 P.2d 498 (1982). The defendant filed a motion re-
questing a psychological examination of the victim, which the court ordered.
The psychologist performed the examination and, at the defense counsel's re-
quest, contacted the prosecutor and reported that "this was one of the worst
cases of rape trauma syndrome he had ever seen." Id. at 468, 641 P.2d at 499.
This conversation was followed by a "suggestion of a plea bargain to a third
degree offense to save the victim from having to testify." Id. No plea agree-
ment was reached. The state then filed notice of intent to call the psychologist
as a witness. The defendant objected, arguing that attorney-client privilege,
work product, Rule 28 of the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
the rules against cumulative and prejudicial evidence prevented the state from
using the results of the examination at the trial. The court concluded that the
defendant's voluntary disclosure of the results of the examination constituted
a waiver of any privileges or other protection from discovery. The admissibil-
ity of the evidence, however, could not be determined outside the context of
the trial, where the court can evaluate the claims of prejudice and cumulative
evidence. Id. at 469, 641 P.2d at 500.
Jackson suggests that increased awareness of RTS could, in appropriate
cases, prompt plea bargaining by defendants and the prosecution. This possi-
bility should be considered in the context of debates about the cost of expert
testimony and the potential of expert testimony about RTS to consume an in-
ordinate amount of court time.
259. See Saltzburg, supra note 250, at 616-48.
260. Obviously, some criminal defendants will be unable to afford an ex-
pert. This problem, however, is not unique to rape defendants and, taken
alone, does not warrant exclusion of expert testimony on RTS. The proper so-
lution is for legislators to provide impecunious defendants with funds for an
independent expert. Two cases currently pending before the United States
Supreme Court raise the question of whether the Constitution compels the
states to provide court-appointed experts for indigent defendants. See Ake v.
Oklahoma, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3687
(U.S. Mar. 19, 1984) (No. 83-5424); Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806 (Miss.
1983), cert granted sub nomr. Caldwell v. Mississippi, Oct. 9, 1984 (No. 83-6607).
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about the victim's credibility, though it, like any other evidence,
may affect the jury's assessment of her credibility. Wigmore's
court-ordered examinations were to determine the mental ca-
pacity of complainants for truth telling and to uncover any ab-
normality that might affect the complainant's credibility.
Wigmore's belief that the examinations were necessary only in
sexual assault cases resulted from his exaggerated suspicion of
women. In contrast, the object of the psychological examina-
tion proposed herein is to uncover characteristic trauma in a
woman who alleges she has been raped. The underlying as-
sumption-that many women who have been raped experience
trauma that tends to manifest itself in RTS symptoms-is based
on reliable studies of rape victims and quite obviously grew out
of efforts to better understand and treat victims of sexual as-
sault. Accordingly, the risks, the objectives, and the roots of
the examination differ from those of the examinations Wig-
more proposed, and the objections to the latter thus do not
apply.
III. PSYCHOLOGY: THE ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS IN THE COURTROOM
A. OUR TROUBLE WITH PSYCHOLOGY
The RTS decisions of the California, Minnesota, and Mis-
souri courts contradict the evidentiary principles cited in those
decisions. One explanation for the incongruity between what
courts say and what they do with regard to RTS evidence is
that judges intuitively may not trust the assessment by mental
health professionals that the professionals' theories and meth-
ods are reliable. Some people insist that psychology and psychi-
atry are, at best, mere speculation about an enormously
complex and elusive subject.261 Judicial distrust of this specula-
tion may be greatest when it is offered against a criminal de-
fendant on the "ultimate issue" of whether a crime has
occurred262 and thus might have prompted the courts to ex-
clude RTS evidence even though a consensus of the relevant
scientific community considers it reliable.
Ziskin, who opposes the use of expert psychological testi-
mony in trials, likely would approve of the exclusion of RTS.263
261. See authorities cited infra note 263.
262. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 209, at 434-35 (the law's tolerance
for speculation and imprecision is lowest when the speculation provides the
basis for criminal liability or for significant stigmatization or punishment).
263. His two volume treatise, which contains arguments against the court-
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His criticism of courtroom use of psychology is biting-
[D]espite the ever increasing utilization of psychiatric and psychologi-
cal evidence in the legal process, such evidence frequently does not
meet reasonable criteria of admissability and should not be admitted
in a court of law and, if admitted, should be given little or no weight.
It is unfortunate that because of the need of courts for the assistance
they hope these "experts" can provide, because of the requirement
that attorneys use any means legally available to advance the cause of
their clients, and because of the ignorance or unwillingness to face
facts on the part of the "experts" involved, such testimony continues
to be accorded scientific status. In the light of current scientific evi-
dence, there is no reason to consider such testimony as other than
highly speculative.2 6 4
Other writers, however, disagree with Ziskin's skepticism
about the helpfulness of mental health professionals in the
legal process. They argue that the value of the experts is not a
function of whether their methods or theories are as reliable as
expert opinions in other areas of medicine or science but of
whether the experts can offer better or more information than
the jury or judge would have otherwise.265 Most comm-
room use of psychology, is designed to assist lawyers in defending against ex-
pert testimony. See 1 J. ZISKIN, supra note 225; see also Ennis & iUtwack,
supra note 224; Falknor & Steffen, Evidence of Character. From the "Crucible
of the Community" to the "Couch of the Psychiatris4 " 102 U. PA. L REV. 980,
994 (1954); Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert-Some
Comments Concerning Criminal Responsibility and the Decline of the Age of
Therapy, 2 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 99 (1976); Comment, The Psychologist as
Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 MD. L. REV. 539 (1979); f.
Note, Hearsay Bases of Psychiatric Opinion Testimony: A Critique of Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, 51 S. CAL. I- REV. 129 (1977) (criticizing admissibility of
expert testimony based on hearsay and suggesting safeguards for reliability).
264. 1 J. ZISKiN, supra note 225, at 1. Ziskin further argues that with psy-
chology, the process of collecting "data" may influence the substance of the
data elicited. For example, if a defendant charged with murder is examined by
three psychiatrists and each asks the defendant about thoughts of suicide after
the act, the answer could go from "No" to "I'm not sure, I don't recall" to
"Yes." Ziskin offers two possible reasons for the change in answers: the de-
fendant realizes the benefits of an affirmative answer, or repetitive asking
plants the idea of suicide in the defendant's mind. See id. at 29. Also, accord-
ing to Ziskin, psychiatry "is a field where there is maximum opportunity for
biases to operate because it is based almost entirely on 'soft' knowledge and to
a large extent on 'soft' data." Id. at 38. The only '"hrd" data psychiatrists and
psychologists can observe is behavior-verbal and otherwise--from which they
make inferences about a person's inner self. Ziskin maintains these inferences
lack sound foundation and are little more than "fanciful speculation." Id. at 9.
265. See, eg., Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 209, at 463; Delman, Participa-
tion by Psychologists in Insanity Defense Proceedings: An Advocacy, 9 J. PSY-
cmATRY & L. 247 (1981); Diamond & LouiseRl, The Psychiatrist as an Expert
Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MJCH- L. REv. 1335, 1342
(1965). Delman suggests that mental health professionals who object to court-
room use of psychiatry or psychology may lack confidence in their principles
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mentators fall somewhere between the poles of blanket rejec-
tion and uncritical acceptance of expert psychological testimony
and suggest that the legal system needs to develop a means of
presenting this evidence that would minimize its dangers with-
out sacrificing its potential benefits.266
Professor Bonnie, a defender of psychiatric participation in
the criminal process, believes that
[a]dministration of the penal law sometimes requires the resolution of
questions that can be answered only by approximation....
... Of course the law should be sensitive to the limits of profes-
sional understanding. But it should not ignore clinical perspectives on
human behavior simply because they fall short of the physicist's un-
derstanding of the laws of motion. 267
The problems with expert psychological testimony, Bonnie
maintains, derive from the legal system's shortcomings and not
from the supposed deficiencies of the testimony. He continues:
If experts give conclusory testimony, encompassing so-called ultimate
issues--and fail to explain the basis for their opinions-the fault lies
with the bench and bar, not with experts. If forensic evaluators do
not have access to the same information and reach different opinions
for this reason, the fault lies with the legal system, not with the
experts.26 8
Bonnie's argument makes sense. If the law forces jurors
and judges to make decisions that entail approximation and
speculation, and if psychology can add meaningful insight to as-
sist them, that information should be admitted. Accordingly,
because the law of rape forces fact finders to decide questions
of credibility, perception, and intent, and because expert testi-
mony on RTS can add meaningful information to assist them,
such testimony should be admitted.
The hostility some people express toward psychology and
expert psychological testimony also may reflect misplaced frus-
tration about the inability to reduce variables that the law
deems significant to objective and certain principles. The ap-
propriate response, however, is not to exclude expert psycho-
logical testimony simply because it is not absolute. Instead,
and skills and thus fear exposing them to the adversarial process. Other bases
for their resistance suggested by Delman include the ethical dilemma of "Who
is the client?" and a concern, at least with regard to the insanity defense, that
the issue is essentially a moral judgment that experts should not make for so-
ciety. Delman, supra, at 252-53, 256-57.
266. See, e.g., Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 209.
267. Bonnie, Morality, Equality and Expertise: Renegotiating the Relation-
ship between Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA.
TRY & L. 5, 5 (1984).
268. Id. at 5-6.
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either subjective, individualistic factors should be removed
from the legal inquiry-which most people likely would op-
pose-or some meaningful rationale should be developed for
deciding when and how psychology, despite its limitations, can
help.269 Although judges have neither the resources nor the
procedures to determine independently the reliability of a psy-
chological theory or method, lawyers and psychological experts
can study the research about a theory and analyze what that re-
search and theory mean for the particular issue being tried.
The judge, in turn, must actually examine the results of this in-
quiry and articulate a factual basis for the judge's determina-
tion about the helpfulness of the testimony.
Absent this investigation and scrutiny, evidentiary rulings
can be based only on judge's intuition and speculation. Such in-
tuitive rulings then may have a monolithic effect when other
courts simply follow them rather than conducting their own in-
quiries into the helpfulness of the evidence. This result is of-
fensive because it may be wrong on the merits, excluding
potentially helpful evidence or admitting unreliable evidence.
It is also troubling because a decision-making process that is
conclusory and impressionistic undermines people's faith in the
fairness of that process. A review of the decisions in which
courts have admitted expert psychological testimony under-
scores this concern and demonstrates the need for a principled
approach to expert psychological testimony.
B. ACCEPTED USES OF EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
Opponents of expert psychological testimony notwithstand-
ing, courts have admitted such testimony on a wide range of is-
sues. To argue, however, that RTS evidence should be admitted
simply because courts have used other expert psychological tes-
timony is problematic for several reasons.
First, these non-RTS cases may not provide good precedent
269. If, for example, a jurisdiction chooses to follow Frye and defer to the
relevant experts' consensus about the reliability of psychological methods and
theories, see supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text, then it should do so
consistently and according to stated criteria for determining that consensus.
If, however, a jurisdiction chooses to treat the experts' consensus as just one
factor and allow courts to decide for themselves whether a psychological the-
ory or method is reliable, then the courts must develop standard ways of inves-
tigating and resolving whether a theory or method is valid. Likewise, if the
law continues to consider the knowledge or impressionability of jurors as a
factor in the admissibility of expert testimony, then courts must examine evi-
dence about what jurors know and what will in fact overawe or prejudice
them.
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because they, like their counterparts excluding expert psycho-
logical testimony, are conclusory and reveal very little about
the reliability of the underlying psychological theory or
method. Second, the judges give no guidance as to which, if
any, differences or similarities among various forms of expert
psychological testimony are legally significant. For example,
the observation that expert testimony about posttraumatic
stress disorder ("PTSD") has been admitted to prove a defend-
ant's diminished capacity at the time of a murder says very lit-
tle about whether expert testimony on RTS should be
admissible to prove a forcible assault. The characteristics of
PTSD that made it acceptable to the judges simply are not
known, and therefore it cannot be determined whether RTS
shares those characteristics.
This judicial silence renders the usual method of legal rea-
soning-analogy to past decisions-peculiarly unhelpful in ana-
lyzing the admissibility of expert testimony about a new
psychological theory. Nevertheless, the precedent is instructive
as a means of eliminating principles that cannot explain the ex-
clusion of RTS evidence despite the appearance that they do.270
270. The precedent reveals four uses of an expert's psychological diagnosis
or assessment: to reconstruct past behavior or mental status, to assess current
capacity, to predict future capacity or behavior, and to determine the cause of
a current condition.
First, courts have allowed mental health experts to testify about the ef-
fects of an individual's existing psychological disorder or condition on the indi-
vidual's past behavior or mental state. For example, an expert can testify that
a defendant currently suffers from schizophrenia, that the defendant probably
suffered from it at the time of the crime, and that the disorder made the de-
fendant unable to appreciate right and wrong at the time of the crime. See,
e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 994, 1002, 1006-07 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(permitting expert testimony on the causal relationship between a mental dis-
ease and the existence of substantial capacity for control and knowledge at the
time of the act); Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725, 727 (Fla. 1974) (permitting ex-
pert testimony regarding defendant's insanity at the time of the alleged act,
based on expert's examination of defendant and elicited history); State v.
Kelly, 118 N.J. Super. 38, 44-45, 285 A.2d 571, 575 (App. Div.) (same), cert. de-
nied, 60 N.J. 350, 289 A.2d 795 (1972). But see United States v. Lewellyn, 723
F.2d 615, 617-18 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting use of pathological gambling as sup-
port of insanity defense to embezzlement charge because no general accept-
ance in scientific community of condition as mental disease).
Similarly, an expert's testimony that a defendant suffers from "Vietnam
Vet syndrome" or from "battered woman syndrome" could be offered to prove
a diminished capacity at the time of a crime or to support a claim of self-de-
fense. See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146, 1148 (4th Cir. 1982)
(testimony that defendant suffers from posttraumatic stress-"Vietnam
Vet"--disorder offered to prove diminished capacity at time of crime); People
v. Pettibone, No. 9632-C (Sonoma Super. Ct. Cal. Feb. 29, 1980) (same); Smith
v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619-20, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981) (testimony that defend-
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By comparing cases that admit expert testimony to cases
ant suffered from "battered woman syndrome" offered in support of claim of
self-defense); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981) (same); State v.
Cocuzza, No. 1484-79 (N.J. Super. CL Middlesex Co., May 27, 1981) (same);
State v. Mann, Cr. 80-F-75 (Kanawha County CL, Charleston, IV. Va., Apr. 2,
1981) (same); see also United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1981) (er-
ror to exclude expert testimony on susceptibility to inducement where defend-
ant claimed entrapment), cert denied, 104 S. CL 699 (1984); People v. Parks,
195 Colo. 344, 347, 579 P.2d 76, 78 (1978) (testimony admitted on defendant's
ability to make free and intelligent decisions at the time of his arrest); People
v. Sanchez, 112 Misc. 2d 100, 101-02, 446 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1982)
(testimony about defendant's intelligence admitted to support defense of du-
ress); Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 391, 292 A.2d 286, 289 (1972)
(expert testimony admitted on "heat of passion"). See generally Bonnie &
Slobogin, supra note 209, at 473-74 (a majority of courts permit expert testi-
mony on some variety of the diminished capacity defense).
Finally, an expert's testimony that a defendant does not match the psy-
chological profile of a sexual deviate could be offered to prove that the defend-
ant did not commit a sexual assault This is a more tenuous inference than the
preceding ones because it includes the step from an individual's psychological
make-up to his or her behavior rather than to his or her state of mind. See,
e.g., People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 225, 266 P.2d 38, 43 (1954) (allowing testi-
mony of psychiatrist that defendant charged with sexual abuse was not a sex-
ual deviate). But cf. United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 227-28 (4th Cir.
1982) (holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert psychiatric testimony
that defendant's personality configuration was inconsistent with violent
murders of his family), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983); Douglas v. United
States, 386 A.2d 289, 296 (D.C. 1978) (holding psychologist may not testify re-
garding defendant's capacity to commit child molestation, because psychology
not exact enough to determine reliably that defendant did not commit a crime
by examining his characteristics); State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 526, 443 A.2d
1020, 1029 (1982) (rejecting expert testimony of psychiatrist that defendant did
not match the psychological profile of a rapist because, although relevant, de-
fendant failed to prove the evidence was accepted as reliable); State v.
Holcomb, 643 S.W.2d 336, 340-41 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (excluding testimony
by psychologist that defendant's personality made him unlikely to have en-
gaged in violent behavior because it seemed "more a matter of speculation
than of science").
When expert psychological testimony is offered against a party to prove
that he or she acted consistently with the expert's diagnosis on a particular oc-
casion, the traditional bar to character evidence offered to prove propensity
may apply. See, e.g., State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981) (holding
prosecution cannot introduce evidence of "battered child syndrome" or estab-
lish defendant's "character" as a battering parent unless defendant first puts
character in issue). At least one court has cited this propensity rule in exclud-
ing evidence favorable to the defendant. See Freeman v. State, 486 P.2d 967,
972 n.8 (Alaska 1971) (stating that it is "uniformly accepted" that psychiatric
evidence showing that an individual accused of sexually deviant misconduct is
not a sexual psychopath should probably be regarded as character evidence).
Mental health experts also have testified about their diagnosis of an ex-
isting psychological disorder or condition and assessment of the effects of that
disorder or condition on an individual's current capacity or well-being. Exam-
ples include expert testimony on competency of an individual to stand trial,
see, eg., Blunt v. United States, 389 F.2d 545, 547-48, passim (D.C. Cir. 1967);
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that exclude testimony about RTS, we can critique the possible
rationales for rejection of RTS testimony. For example, judges
routinely admit an expert's prediction of future dangerousness
of a defendant. When such a judge then excludes testimony on
RTS, several possible reasons for the latter ruling can be elimi-
nated. The relevant experts' assessment of the reliability of the
theory and underlying research cannot explain the conclusion.
Rape specialists believe that RTS accurately describes typical
psychological trauma in victims of nonconsensual intercourse,
whereas professionals and laypersons alike have concluded that
expert predictions of future dangerousness are subject to sub-
stantial error.2 71 An alternative explanation for the different
rulings might be the judge's perception that RTS is a credibility
assessment whereas a future dangerousness prediction is not.
Thus, because credibility assessments are the exclusive prov-
ince of the jury, the judge may believe that juries must decide
the issue of consent in rape trials without the aid of RTS testi-
Colbert v. State, 18 Md. App. 632, 641-42, 308 A.2d 726, 732 (1973); People v.
Crawford, 66 Mich. App. 581, 585-88, 239 N.W.2d 670, 671-73 (1976), expert tes-
timony on an individual's credibility, see supra note 213, expert testimony on
psychological injuries offered to prove damages in a tort action, see, e.g., La-
londe v. Weaver, 360 So. 2d 542, 545-46 (La. App. 1978); Barlow v. Thornhill,
537 S.W.2d 412, 415-16 (Mo. 1976); Select Ins. Co. v. Boucher, 561 S.W.2d 474,
476 (Tex. 1978), and expert testimony offered on the issue of parental fitness
in custody proceedings, see, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 1397-1400,
140 N.W.2d 152, 156-58, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966). This last category has
a predictive component as well, for the judge is also speculating as to future
fitness.
In addition, mental health experts have testified about the effects of an
existing psychological disorder or condition on an individual's future capacity
or behavior. Examples include expert predictions of future dangerousness of
criminals in sentencing or parole determinations, see, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle,
103 S. Ct. 3383, 3396 (1983), and expert testimony predicting the future psycho-
logical cost of psychic injuries in a tort action, see, e.g., Crown Drug Co. v. Mac-
Bride, 303 P.2d 970, 978-79 (Okla. 1956).
Finally, some courts have allowed mental health experts to testify about
the likely past cause of an existing psychological disorder or condition. For ex-
ample, an expert's testimony that a child suffers from characteristic psycholog-
ical problems may be offered to prove the child is a victim of child abuse and
has not fantasized the incident, see, e.g., State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 607-08,
645 P.2d 1330, 1338 (1982); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, -, 657 P.2d 1215,
1220-21 (1983); State v. Harwood, 45 Or. App. 931, 939-40, 609 P.2d 1312, 1317
(1980); Commonwealth v. Stago, 267 Pa. Super. 90, 406 A.2d 533, 535 (1979), or
an expert's testimony that a woman suffers from RTS may be offered to prove
that she is a victim of rape, see supra note 185.
271. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 209, at 442-46; Dix, Clinical Evalu-
ation of the "Dangerousness" of "Normal" Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L.
REV. 523, 544-46 (1980); Ennis & Litwack, supra note 224, at 737; Slobogin,
Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. - (1984).
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mony, although juries may be guided by expert testimony in re-
gard to a defendant's potential dangerousness in the future. As
shown above,272 however, this rationale is a weak one that
probably masks distrust of the evidence rather than revealing
solicitude for the jury. Finally, the differing results cannot be
explained by the potential cost of erroneous or unreliable testi-
mony. A judge should be as concerned about the margin of er-
ror in a future dangerousness prediction, which is used for
parole and sentencing purposes, as about the potential error in
RTS diagnosis, which is used for conviction purposes, because
expert predictions of future dangerousness are allowed when
capital punishment is a possible sentence. Thus, the admission
of expert testimony about future dangerousness raises ques-
tions about whether the exclusion of testimony about RTS is an
arbitrary result.
A situation in which a judge admits expert testimony on
the psychological effects of child sexual assault but excludes
RTS testimony is even harder to justify. The evidence in both
cases is based on similar inferences: a child/woman who
manifests y symptoms, experienced generally by victims of
child sexual assault/adult rape, likely is a victim of as-
sault/rape. The only apparent difference is the assumption that
consent cannot be an issue in a child sexual assault case. Credi-
bility is the key factor in both cases, however. Both crimes are
difficult to prove because of the private nature of the act and
the absence of witnesses other than the participants. In both
cases the testimony is offered by the prosecution, and in both
cases the penalty is extremely harsh. Yet child sexual assault
cases expressly admit testimony to bolster credibility273 and
adult rape cases seldom do.
Although both the sexual abuse of a child and the rape of
an adult are heinous acts, it may be that the helplessness and
immaturity of the child make the rape of a child more outra-
geous to judges than the rape of an adult. This could prompt
272. See supra text accompanying notes 211-22.
273. E.g., State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 607, 645 P.2d 1330, 1337-38 (1982);
State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, -, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219-20 (1983); see also State
v. Harwood, 45 Or. App. 931, 939-40, 609 P.2d 1312, 1317 (1980) (expert evidence
relating to child witness credibility in sexual abuse case is admissible if related
to witness's ability to perceive, remember, or relate but not to prove complain-
ant's veracity). Disbelief of the complainant occurs in child sexual abuse cases
as it does in adult rape cases. This disbelief is arguably more logical in child-
abuse cases because most of the few reported cases of false accusations involve
children. See supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
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judges to rule more favorably on evidence offered by the state
in child molestation cases. Also, the primary fears in child sex-
ual abuse cases likely are misidentification and fabrication. The
fears in a consent-rape case, however, go beyond fabrication
and include the many myths previously described. These
myths and fears may be harder for some judges to overcome
than the fears associated with child molestation and thus may
make them less inclined to admit new kinds of expert testi-
mony that would aid the prosecution. Nevertheless, a judge's
opinions about the seriousness of a crime and sympathy for a
victim are improper bases for rulings on expert testimony.
Comparison of these examples of approved uses of expert
psychological testimony with the exclusion of RTS testimony
does not reveal the true rationale for the rulings. It merely
eliminates some potential explanations and suggests that the
real basis for the rulings is not the appropriate one: the rela-
tive reliability of the underlying theory or method. The deci-
sions cannot be explained solely by judicial distrust of
psychiatrists, because psychiatric evidence is admitted in many
cases. The severity of the sanction likewise fails as a rationale
because expert textimony is admitted in other cases in which
the sanction is equally or more severe. 274 The results do not
274. The California court attempts to explain this inconsistency by arguing
that in some of these cases, the testimony is offered to rebut the defendant's
suggestion that the victim's behavior was inconsistent with the claim of rape.
In this context, the expert testimony "may play a particularly useful role by
disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape
victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular
myths." Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457. This is
an odd argument, as it suggests that the California court is not concerned
about the methodology of studies on reactions to sexual assault when the stud-
ies contradict people's views but is concerned when they confirm people's
views. The methodology-reliance on victims' accounts of their assaults-is
the same in both contexts. In addition, as has been shown, rape mythology is
especially significant and distorting in consent-rape cases, and RTS evidence
therefore should be "particularly useful" in those cases.
What the court may have meant is that the evidence may be admitted to
rebut the defendant's argument that the complainant's actions were inconsis-
tent with those of a typical rape victim. In arguing this, the defendant has im-
plicitly opened the door to evidence about what typical reactions are. When,
however, the prosecution offers RTS evidence as part of its case-in-chief, then
the defendant has not (affirmatively) injected popular myths about typical re-
actions to rape into the trial and thus may prevent the prosecution from intro-
ducing the evidence.
The obvious problem with this analysis is that a defendant cannot "open
the door" to unreliable rebuttal evidence. The California court suggests that
an RTS diagnosis is not a reliable indicator of whether a rape has occurred be-
cause the studies on RTS involved no investigation of the victims' accounts.
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depend on whether the state rather than the defendant offers
the testimony, because expert psychological testimony favoring
a defendant, such as that a defendant lacks the propensity to
commit a violent act or does not match the profile of a rapist,
has also been excluded.275 Finally, fear of invading the prov-
ince of the jury cannot be the rationale for the exclusion of
RTS evidence, because expert testimony about a child's credi-
bility is admitted, as is evidence about an adult complainant's
credibility when offered by the defendant.
No single principle seems to guide the courts in their deci-
sions to exclude RTS evidence. Judges instead react to the evi-
dence on a case-by-case basis, invoking broad discretion and
general legal standards to support their visceral responses.
They do not, however, decide the cases on the basis of an inves-
tigation of the four factors that should help determine the help-
fulness of the evidence. Moreover, the decisions they reach are
irreconcilable, unpredictable, and virtually unreviewable. This
is a poor process that has, at least in the case of the RTS issue,
produced a bad result.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Rape is a crime that few understand. People misperceive
why it occurs, when or where it happens, how it might be pre-
vented, and what effect it has on a victim. When a woman
claims she was raped and the man claims she consented, mis-
perceptions about rape play a prominent and documented role
in the fact finder's imagination and speculation about who is
telling the truth. A qualified expert who has examined the wo-
man and detected signs of RTS can help to educate this fact
finder in several ways. The expert can confirm the existence of
trauma consistent with the woman's allegation of nonconsent.
The expert can also, in explaining RTS, help the jurors to un-
derstand the psychological cost of rape-even when the victim
is a nonvirgin or a prostitute, lacks physical injuries, met her
The court believes that the profile of a rape victim that emerges from these
studies is no measure of the typical legal rape victim's reaction to an assault.
If that is true, then rebuttal testimony about RTS would not tend to disprove
the defendant's version of a typical reaction to a rape, even if it were inconsis-
tent with the defendant's version of a typical reaction. The admissibility of ex-
pert testimony under prevailing evidentiary principles does not depend on
whether the testimony is offered as substantive evidence or for impeachment
purposes; it hinges on reliability and helpfulness of the evidence.
275. See, e.g., MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 227; Cavallo, 88 N.J. at 526. 443 A.2d
at 1024; Holcomb, 643 S.W.2d at 341.
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assailant in a bar, or is married to him. Further, the expert can
help to dispel the fact finder's confusion of seduction fantasies
with the reality of rape. Hearing, perhaps for the first time,
about the profound fear and long-term psychological trauma
that rape can cause, the fact finder may overcome traditional
disbelief of a complainant who was raped by someone who was
not a stranger wielding a weapon in a dark alley.
Finally, a treating expert who diagnoses RTS in a com-
plainant can also help to educate the victim, who also likely
knew nothing about rape until it happened to her. The exper-
ienced expert can help her to understand her reactions to the
assault and may thereby help her to avoid self-blame and self-
punishment. Moreover, the expert's courtroom testimony
about her emotional pain and trauma may give the woman a
sense of being heard that may help her to withstand the de-
fendant's inevitable and rightful attack on her credibility and
perception.
As the law of sexual assault and the attitudes toward the
crime and its victims change,276 the role of mental health ex-
perts in sexual assault cases also will change. For example,
public education about sexual assault eventually may reduce
the need for education of the fact finder about the psychologi-
cal aftermath of a nonstereotypic assault. When the myths
about the crime of rape and its victims are dispelled, then the
need for experts to combat those myths ideally will disappear
as well. Until that time, however, the experts can help an im-
perfect process work in a more informed, more enlightened
way.
276. The law is changing. See generally H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note
41, at 153; Ranii, State's New Rape Laws Taking Hold, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 5, 1983,
at 1, col. 1. These legal changes both reflect and produce changes in attitudes.
H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 41, at 153.
Significant legal changes include the rape shield statutes that protect com-
plainants from unwarranted intrusions into their sexual histories, see id. at
171; FED. R. EVID. 412, and the redrafting of rape laws to include rape within
marriage, see Ranii, supra. See generally Comment, Spousal Exemption to
Rape, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 120 (1981). Other developments include an increasing
number of civil suits brought by rape survivors, including tort actions against
third parties such as employers, owners of shopping centers, and others who
fail to maintain reasonably safe conditions for employees or patrons. See, e.g.
Skaria v. State, 110 Misc. 2d 711, 442 N.Y.S.2d 838 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981). See gen-
erally Ballou, Recourse for Rape Victims: Third Party Liability, 4 HARV. WO.
MEN'S L.J. 105 (1981); Hauserman & Lansing, Rape on Campus: Postsecondary
Institutions as Third Party Defendants, 8 J. COLL. & U.L. 182, 184 (1981-1982)
(predicting an increase in number of suits brought against postsecondary insti-
tutions by plaintiffs seeking damages resulting from sexual assaults).
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